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I
INTRODUCTION
While the idea of court-appointed experts has been supported by individuals
concerned with the courts’ ability to assess scientific and technical evidence,1 it
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This article is adapted from a more lengthy report prepared for the Court Administration and Case
Management Committee of the Judicial Conference of the United States.  In gathering information for
this article, we are indebted to many individuals for their comments and suggestions on the courts’
appointment of neutral experts in the silicone breast implant litigation.  We are also grateful to Judge
Robert E. Jones and Chief Judge Sam C. Pointer (Ret.), who presided over the formation of expert
panels in Hall v. Baxter Healthcare, Corp., 947 F. Supp. 1387 (D. Or. 1996) and In re Silicone Gel Breast
Implants Products Liability Litigation, 793 F. Supp. 1098 (J.P.M.L. 1992), respectively, as well as the
participants in these two cases, including the technical advisors, selection panel members, science panel
members, special counsel, and attorneys.  Their insights enriched our report.  We also acknowledge the
indispensable assistance of Judge John Koeltl of the Southern District of New York who served as our
liaison to the Court Administration and Case Management Committee on this project.  Among the
staff at the Federal Judicial Center, we thank Donna Stienstra for her comments on earlier draft reports
and Kristina Gill for her research assistance.  The views expressed are those of the authors and not
necessarily those of the Federal Judicial Center.
1. See, e.g., CARNEGIE COMM. ON SCIENCE, TECH., AND GOV’T., SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
IN JUDICIAL DECISION MAKING 37 (1993);  Bert Black et al., Science and the Law in the Wake of
Daubert: A New Search for Scientific Knowledge, 72 TEX. L. REV. 715, 795-96 (1994) (suggesting
court-appointed experts as a means of testing the evidentiary reliability of scientific evidence after
Daubert); Dan L. Burk, When Scientists Act Like Lawyers: The Problem of Adversary Science, 33
JURIMETRICS J. 363 (1993); Joe S. Cecil & Thomas E. Willging, Accepting Daubert’s Invitation:
Defining a Role for Court-Appointed Experts in Assessing Scientific Validity, 43 EMORY L.J. 995 (1994)
(describing the results of surveys and interviews with federal judges regarding court-appointed experts);
Si-Hung Choy, Judicial Education After Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc.: The Use of Court-
Appointed Experts, 47 UCLA L. REV. 1423 (2000); Ellen E. Deason, Court-Appointed Expert
Witnesses: Scientific Positivism Meets Bias and Deference, 77 OR. L. REV. 59 (1998); E. Donald Elliott,
Toward Incentive-Based Procedure: Three Approaches for Regulating Scientific Evidence, 69 B.U. L.
REV. 487, 507-11 (1989); Howard M. Erichson, Mass Tort Litigation and Inquisitorial Justice, 87 GEO.
L.J. 1983 (1999) (urging the use of court-appointed experts in mass tort litigation); Samuel R. Gross,
Expert Evidence, 1991 WIS. L. REV. 1113 (suggesting court-appointed experts as a solution to the
problems that arise with testimony by parties’ experts); Pamela Louise Johnston, Court-Appointed
Scientific Expert Witnesses: Unfettering Expertise, 2 HIGH TECH. L.J. 249 (1988); John H. Langbein, The
German Advantage in Civil Procedure, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 823, 858-66 (1985) (suggesting that the
growing managerial responsibilities in the role of a federal judge will lead to increases in the use of
court-appointed experts); Carl B. Rubin & Laura Ringenbach, The Use of Court Experts in Asbestos
Litigation, 137 F.R.D. 35 (1991) (reporting on the use of court-appointed medical experts in asbestos);
Jane F. Thorpe et al., Court-Appointed Experts and Technical Advisors, LITIG., Summer 2000, at 31;
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has often been resisted by attorneys and judges who confront such evidence.2
An increasing number of recent cases, however, suggest that court-appointed
experts are gaining acceptance, even though appointments remain rare.3  Such
growing acceptance may be due to the increasingly difficult nature of scientific
and technical evidence,4 or to Justice Stephen G. Breyer’s recent endorsement
of such experts in General Electric Co. v.  Joiner.5  Moreover, recent programs
to aid judges in locating qualified experts who are willing to serve will likely en-
courage further appointments.6
Nevertheless, the appointment of such experts remains sufficiently rare that
problems are difficult to anticipate.  In two recent cases—Hall v. Baxter
Healthcare Corp.7 and In re Silicone Gel Breast Implants Products Liability Liti-
gation8—federal judges appointed panels of scientific experts to help assess con-
Tahirih V. Lee, Note, Court-Appointed Experts and Judicial Reluctance: A Proposal to Amend Rule 706
of the Federal Rules of Evidence, 6 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 480, 494-503 (1988).
2. See Cecil & Willging, supra note 1, at 1018-19 (recounting judges’ reasons for reluctance in
appointing an expert); Ellen Relkin, Some Implications of Daubert and Its Potential for Misuse:
Misapplication to Environmental Tort Cases and Abuse of Rule 706(a) Court-Appointed Experts, 15
CARDOZO L. REV. 2255 (1994).
3. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 706 advisory committee’s note (“[E]xperience indicates that actual
appointment is a relatively infrequent occurrence.”); 3 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A.
BERGER, WEINSTEIN’S EVIDENCE ¶ 706[01], at 706-13 (noting the “remarkably few cases in which
federal judges have appointed experts”).  A Westlaw search of federal cases for the term “court
appointed expert” reveals a greater number of case citations for each of the years following the
decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), than in any of the
preceding 10 years.  Prior to Daubert, the number of citations ranged from 17 to 43 per year; after
Daubert, the range is from 48 to 72 case citations, with a gentle upward trend.  For estimates of the
incidence of appointment of experts by federal judges, see Cecil & Willging, supra note 1, at 1004-07.
For estimates of the incidence of appointment under a broad range of authority to serve in managerial
as well as testifying roles, see Ellen E. Deason, Managing the Managerial Expert, 1998 U. ILL. L. REV.
341, 347 n.19.  For estimates of the incidence of appointment by state court judges, see Anthony
Champagne et al., The Problem with Empirical Examination of the Use of Court-Appointed Experts: A
Report of Non-Findings, 14 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 361, 364 (1996); Daniel W. Shuman et al., An Empirical
Examination of the Use of Expert Witnesses in the Courts—Part II: A Three City Study, 34 JURIMETRICS
J. 193, 204 (1994).
4. See FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMM., REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY
COMMITTEE 97 (1990) (“Economic, statistical, technological, and natural and social scientific data are
becoming increasingly important in both routine and complex litigation.”); see also Erichson, supra
note 1, at 1986 (noting that trends in mass tort litigation suggest greater use of “inquisitorial tools”
within the adversarial system); Relkin, supra note 2, at 2255 n.4 (suggesting that Rule 706 experts will
become more common following Daubert).
5. 522 U.S. 136, 149-50 (1997) (Breyer, J., concurring) (urging judges to appoint scientific experts
to help courts fulfill their gatekeeping function under Daubert); see also Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595
(listing the appointment of experts under Rule 706 among the procedures that judges should consider
when confronted with difficult scientific evidence).
6. The American Association for the Advancement of Science (“AAAS”) has developed a pilot
project to provide federal judges with candidates recruited from science and professional organizations
willing to serve as court-appointed experts.  See Court Appointed Scientific Experts: A Demonstration
Project of the AAAS (visited Jan. 29, 2001) <http://www.aaas.org/spp/case/case.htm>.  The Private
Adjudication Center at Duke University has established a registry of independent scientific and
technical experts who are willing to provide advice to courts or serve as court-appointed experts.  See
Registry of Independent Scientific and Technical Advisors (visited Jan. 29, 2001)
<http://www.law.duke.edu/ pac/registry/index.html>.
7. 947 F. Supp. 1387 (D. Or. 1996).
8. 793 F. Supp. 1098 (J.P.M.L. 1992).
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flicting scientific testimony regarding causation of systemic injuries by silicone
gel breast implants.  This article will describe the circumstances that gave rise to
the appointments, the procedures followed in making the appointments and re-
porting to the courts, and the reactions of the participants in the proceedings.  It
will also offer specific suggestions for improving the use of such panels of ap-
pointed science experts.  Expert panels may be developed and used in a variety
of ways; these approaches illustrate only two forms that such panels may take.
Part II offers a brief overview of the silicone gel breast implant product li-
ability litigation and the two cases in which science panels were appointed.9
Subsequent parts compare the procedures used to select the experts, the in-
struction of the expert panels in their tasks, the preparation of the panels’ re-
ports, the depositions and testimony of the panel members, and the costs of the
two programs.  Part VIII provides a preliminary assessment of the effect of each
program based on the participants’ impressions and citations to the reports in
related litigation.  Finally, Part IX summarizes participants’ overall reactions to
the two procedures and suggests issues for judges to consider when appointing
future panels.
II
OVERVIEW OF SILCONE GEL BREAST IMPLANT LITIGATION
Claims of systemic injuries arising from silicone gel breast implants have
presented some of the most complex scientific evidence issues in the federal
courts.10  Following the removal of silicone gel breast implants from the market
9. Our approach in gathering information differed for the two programs.  Because the experts in
the Oregon program delivered their reports before we began the study, our analysis was based on
interviews in which participants recounted events that had, in some instances, occurred months in the
past.  The participants were aware of Judge Jones’ ruling in the case, and it may have influenced their
assessment of the procedure.  Most interviews were conducted in person during a three-day visit to the
court.  Interviews with the attorneys took place at a conference that Judge Jones convened in his
chambers upon our arrival.  The multidistrict litigation program in Judge Pointer’s court, on the other
hand, was in its early stages when we began our study; therefore, we were able, over a two-year period,
to attend a number of hearings and to have ongoing discussions with some participants regarding the
development of the program.  As a result, we have much more detailed information about the
operation of Judge Pointer’s program.  Discussions with the members of the selection panel involved
activities that had taken place before the beginning of the study.  Interviews with experts, special
counsel, and attorneys were delayed until the completion of the videotaped trial deposition of the
appointed experts.  Most of the formal interviews were conducted by telephone, and in most instances
we promised the panel members that we would not attribute specific comments to any individual.
10. For an overview of litigation concerning silicone gel breast implants, see generally MARCIA
ANGELL, SCIENCE ON TRIAL: THE CLASH OF MEDICAL EVIDENCE AND THE LAW IN THE BREAST
IMPLANT CASE (1996); MARY WHITE STEWART, SILICONE SPILLS: BREAST IMPLANTS ON TRIAL
(1998).  For commentary on the use of panels of appointed experts in silicone gel product liability
litigation, see generally Erichson, supra note 1; Barbara S. Hulka et al., Experience of a Scientific Panel
Formed to Advise the Federal Judiciary on Silicone Breast Implants, 342 NEW ENG. J. MED. 812 (2000);
Karen Butler Reisinger, Court-Appointed Expert Panels: A Comparison of Two Models, 32 IND. L.
REV. 225 (1998) (comparing the role of the expert panels in Hall and In re Silicone Breast Implants);
James T. Rosenbaum, Lessons from Litigation over Silicone Breast Implants: A Call for Activism by
Scientists, 276 SCIENCE 1524 (1997); Joseph Sanders & David H. Kaye, Expert Advice on Silicone
Implants: Hall v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 37 JURIMETRICS J. 113 (1997); Thorpe et al., supra note 1, at
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in 1992 by the Food and Drug Administration, more than 400,000 cases were
filed in federal and state courts alleging injuries arising from leakage or rupture
of the shell that encased the silicone gel.  The most troublesome allegation con-
cerned the extent to which the silicone gel caused or exacerbated connective tis-
sue diseases or immune system dysfunction.11  Research on these issues was be-
ing reported even as the cases were being litigated.12  Moreover, an assessment
of this research required an understanding of several areas of science, including
epidemiology, toxicology, immunology, rheumatology, chemistry, and statistics.
The emerging nature of this research and differing research methodologies have
made such cases among the most difficult ever presented in federal courts.13
The federal courts have responded to this wave of difficult cases by consoli-
dating the cases for pretrial proceedings.  In 1992, the Judicial Panel on Multi-
district Litigation transferred all silicone gel breast implant product liability
cases filed in federal courts to the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Alabama before Chief Judge Sam C. Pointer, Jr.14  As cases became
ready for trial, Judge Pointer returned them to the districts of origin with the
expectation that early trials would set benchmarks that could be used to en-
courage settlement negotiations.  Among those early cases was a group of ap-
proximately seventy cases returned to the District of Oregon that gave rise to
Hall v. Baxter Healthcare Corp.
The procedural circumstances that led to the appointment of the expert
panel in the federal breast implant litigation are recounted more fully elsewhere
and will not be repeated here.15  The following is a summary of the activities of
31; Laurens Walker & John Monahan, Scientific Authority: The Breast Implant Litigation and Beyond,
86 VA. L. REV. 801 (2000).
11. Allegations of systemic injuries were only one of several claims raised by plaintiffs in this
litigation.  Plaintiffs typically alleged causes of action for “negligence, fraud and misrepresentation,
strict liability, breach of express and implied warranties, violation of various consumer protection
statutes and loss of consortium.”  In re Breast Implant Cases, 942 F. Supp. 958, 959 (E. & S.D.N.Y.
1996).  Plaintiffs also claimed a variety of “local injuries” including “capsular contracture, rupture,
leakage, migration, granulomas, infection and temporary or permanent disfigurement.”  Id.; see also
Sanders & Kaye, supra note 10, at 117 (“Plaintiffs have claimed a variety of injuries due to implants.
Some cases involve ruptured implants, and affected plaintiffs often seek compensation for pain,
inflammation, and other local effects, as well as the expense of having the implant replaced or
removed.”).
12. See INSTITUTE OF MED., SAFETY OF SILICONE BREAST IMPLANTS 11 (Stuart Bonduant et al.
eds., 2000) available at <http://books.nap.edu/books/0309065321/html /index.html> (visited Apr. 10,
2001) (“Evidence suggests that [connective tissue diseases, cancer, neurological diseases or other
systematic complaints or conditions] are no more common in women with breast implants than in
women without breast implants.”); see also id. at 179-97, 215-32.
13. For a comparison of the findings by the Institute of Medicine study and the National Science
Panel in the multidistrict litigation, see id. at 505-14 app. C.
14. The multiple attempts to develop settlement agreements are recounted in Erichson, supra note
1, at 1991 (noting that the expert panel’s report of the panel “appears to have been a driving force” in
settling the Dow Corning bankruptcy agreement); and Walker & Monahan, supra note 10, at 805-07.
15. For a summary of the procedural posture of the litigation when the expert panels were
appointed, see LAURAL L. HOOPER ET AL., NEUTRAL SCIENCE PANELS: TWO EXAMPLES OF PANELS
OF COURT-APPOINTED EXPERTS IN THE BREAST IMPLANTS PRODUCT LIABILITY LITIGATION 7-8,
13-15 (2000) [hereinafter FJC STUDY].  For Judge Pointer’s orders concerning the National Science
Panel, see, e.g., Order No. 31, Appointment of Rule 706 Expert Witnesses, In re Silicone Gel Breast
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the expert panels in Hall and the multidistrict litigation; a more detailed ac-
count is set forth in the sections that follow.  Our analysis of the activities of the
two expert panels will stress the difference in the roles that they were asked to
play in the litigation.
In Hall, Judge Jones used the expert panel to help resolve twenty-five joint
motions in limine that sought to exclude the testimony of plaintiffs’ expert wit-
nesses in cases consolidated for trial.16  Although the experts were appointed as
“technical advisors” under the inherent authority of the court,17 Judge Jones
agreed to a number of procedural protections required when experts are ap-
pointed under Rule 706.18  Because he was considering the admissibility of
challenged evidence, Judge Jones framed his instructions to the panel of experts
around the Daubert standards at the time.19  Approximately four months after
their appointment, the experts submitted individual reports, in general sug-
gesting that the scientific evidence, which showed that silicone gel breast im-
plants cause disease, is unreliable.20  The parties shared the fees of the panel.21
In comparison, in the multidistrict litigation, Judge Pointer used the expert
panel as court-appointed experts under Rule 706 to develop videotaped testi-
mony on various scientific issues with the intention of having that testimony be-
come part of the record when the cases were returned to the local district
courts.  Judge Pointer’s decision to appoint this panel was, in part, a response to
the actions of Judge Jones and other federal judges who were planning to ap-
Implants Prods. Liab. Litig. (MDL 926), 793 F. Supp. 1098 (J.P.M.L. 1992) (No. CV92-P-10000-S)
(visited Jan. 29, 2001) <http://earth.fjc.gov/ BREIMLIT/ORDERS/order31.rtf>; Order No. 31B,
Confirming Order No. 31, Silicone Gel Breast Implants (No. CV92-P-10000-S) (visited Jan. 29, 2001)
<http://earth.fjc.gov/BREIMLIT/ORDERS/order31b.rtf>; Order No. 31E, Directions to National
Science Panel under FRE 706, Silicone Gel Breast Implants (No. CV92-P-10000-S) (visited Jan. 29,
2001) <http://earth.fjc.gov/BREIMLIT/ORDERS/order31e.rtf>.  For the Report of National Science
Panel, see National Science Panel, Silicone Breast Implants in Relation to Connective Tissue Diseases
and Immunologic Dysfunction (Nov. 17, 1998) (visited Feb. 21, 2001) <http://earth.fjc.gov/BREIMLIT/
SCIENCE/report.htm>.
16. See Hall v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 947 F. Supp. 1387, 1392 n.7 (D. Or. 1996).
17. See Ex parte Peterson, 253 U.S. 300, 312 (1920) (holding that a federal court has the inherent
authority “to appoint persons unconnected with the court to aid judges in the performance of specific
judicial duties”); Reilly v. United States, 863 F.2d 149, 154-55, 159-60 (1st Cir. 1988).
18. Consistent with the procedural safeguards of Rule 706(a), Judge Jones agreed to provide a
written charge to the technical advisors, to communicate with the advisors on the record, and to allow
the attorneys a limited opportunity to question the advisors regarding the content of their reports.  See
FJC STUDY, supra note 15, at 9.
19. See Hall, 947 F. Supp. at 1393-94 (listing the questions posed to the panel members).
20. Three of the technical advisors found little scientific support for the contentions of the
plaintiffs’ experts.  Specifically, the court’s immunologist stated that the plaintiffs’ experts’ position was
neither well-supported by the data available in the published scientific literature nor derived from valid
conclusions of the studies.  See id. at 1461.  Similarly, the rheumatologist criticized plaintiffs’ experts for
using scientifically invalid methodology.  See id. at 1452.  The biochemist concluded that the chemical
studies were based on appropriate methods but that some of the “work was inadequately documented
and of clearly debatable value.”  Id. at 1475–76.  The epidemiologist generally thought that the
plaintiffs’ epidemiologists’ opinions were supported by scientific reasoning and methodology generally
used in the field of epidemiology.  See id. at 1450-51.  Judge Jones, however, excluded the
epidemiological testimony on other grounds, finding plaintiffs’ two experts’ testimony to be unreliable.
See id. at 1405–07.
21. See id. at 1393 n.9.
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point expert panels in cases returned from the multidistrict litigation process.22
Before these expert panels were assembled, the national Plaintiffs’ Steering
Committee (“PSC”), apparently motivated by concerns that local appointments
of experts by national defense attorneys could proliferate and possibly over-
whelm the resources of local plaintiffs’ attorneys, urged Judge Pointer to con-
sider appointing a national panel of experts.23  Defendants opposed the PSC ini-
tiatives to create a national panel primarily on jurisdictional grounds.24  In May
1996, Judge Pointer appointed a panel of special masters to commence the pro-
cess of screening individuals to serve as members of the National Science
Panel.25  Based on their recommendations, Judge Pointer appointed three panel
members in August and a fourth member in September 1996.26  In November
1998, the panel members produced a report indicating a lack of reliable scien-
tific evidence to establish an association between breast implants and any of the
connective tissue diseases or the other autoimmune or rheumatic conditions.27
In February 1999, Judge Pointer presided over discovery depositions of the four
panel members.28  In April 1999, the panel members presented eight days of
22. In addition to Judge Jones’ plans to appoint a panel of experts, Judge Jack Weinstein of the
Eastern District of New York and Judge Harold Baer of the Southern District of New York developed
a plan for appointing a joint panel of experts to serve in breast implant litigation consolidated for trial
in those two districts.  See Joint Order No. 1, Appointment of Special Masters, In re Silicone Gel Breast
Implant Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 96-BI-1 (E.D.N.Y. 1996) and No. 91-CV-6996 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 3, 1996);
see also Barry Meier, Judges Set Up Review Panel for Lawsuits on Implants, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 4, 1996,
at A14.
23. See FJC STUDY, supra note 15, at 14.
24. See id. at 14-15.
25. See Order No. 31, Appointment of Rule 706 Expert Witnesses, In re Silicone Gel Breast
Implants Prods. Liab. Litig. (MDL 926), 793 F. Supp. 1098 (J.P.M.L. 1992) (No. CV92-P-10000-S)
(visited Jan. 29, 2001) <http://earth.fjc.gov/BREIMLIT/ORDERS/order31.rtf>.
26. See Order No. 31C, Appointing Members of National Science Panel, Silicone Gel Breast
Implants (No. CV92-P-10000-S) (visited Jan. 29, 2001) <http://earth.fjc.gov/BREIMLIT/ORDERS/
order31c.rtf>; Order No. 31D, Appointing Additional Member of National Science Panel and
Precluding Ex Parte Communications with Panel Members,  Silicone Gel Breast Implants (No. CV92-P-
10000-S), (visited Jan. 29, 2001) <http://earth.fjc.gov/BREIMLIT/ ORDERS/order31d.rtf>.  Judge
Pointer also appointed a private attorney as special counsel to the national panel of experts and
directed that any communication between the special counsel and the panel members be covered by the
attorney-client privilege.  See Order No. 31F, Appointment of Special Counsel to National Science
Panel, Silicone Gel Breast Implants (No. CV92-P-10000-S) (visited Jan. 29, 2001) <http://
earth.fjc.gov/BREIMLIT/ ORDERS/order31f.rtf>.  Sometime thereafter, a second special counsel was
appointed to help prepare panel members for trial dispositions.
27. See National Science Panel, supra note 15.  The Panel found that the presence of silicone gel
breast implants “do[es] not alter incidence or severity of autoimmune disease” and that women with
implants “do[] not display a silicone-induced systemic abnormality in the . . . cells of the immune
system.”  Id. National Science Panel, Silicone Breast Implants in Relation to Connective Tissue
Diseases and Immunologic Dysfunction, Executive Summary at 5-6 (visited Jan. 29, 2001)
<http://earth.fjc.gov/ BREIMLIT/ SCIENCE/summary.rtf>.  In addition, the Panel found that “[n]o
association was evident between breast implants and any of the . . . connective tissue diseases . . . or the
other autoimmune/rheumatic conditions” and no association was evident between implants and
“undifferentiated connective tissue disease.”  Id. at 6-7.
28. See Order No. 31J, Supplemental Instructions Regarding Discovery Depositions, Silicone Gel
Breast Implants (No. CV92-P-10000-S) (visited Jan. 29, 2001) <http://earth.fjc.gov/BREIMLIT
/ORDERS/order31j.rtf>.
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videotaped trial testimony.29  As of February 2001, the videotapes are still being
edited.  In the interim, all but a few of the cases have been settled, raising ques-
tions about whether the videotapes will ever be shown in a federal trial.  Much
of the cost of the expert panel was paid by the federal judiciary, with parties
sharing the cost of the hearings and the special counsels.30
Table 1 summarizes the differences in the two panels of appointed experts.
These differences are discussed at length in the sections below.
TABLE 1
SUMMARY COMPARISON OF THE TWO USES OF PANELS OF APPOINTED
EXPERTS IN SILICONE GEL BREAST IMPLANT LITIGATION
Hall v.  Baxter Healthcare Corp.
(Judge Robert Jones,
D. Or.)
In re Silicone Gel Breast
Implant Products Liability
Litigation, MDL-926
(Judge Sam Pointer, Jr., N.D.
Ala.)
Purpose of Appointment Aid a single district court in
resolving defendants’ motions
in limine to exclude plaintiffs’
expert scientific testimony
in the context of cases
consolidated for trial
Develop, as part of a multi-
district litigation proceeding,
testimony by court-appointed
experts regarding general
causation for presentation at
trial
Authority for Appointment Appointed as technical advisors
under the authority of Federal
Rule of Evidence 104 and on
the inherent authority of the
court
Appointed as court-appointed
experts under the authority of
Federal Rule of Evidence 706
Primary Product of Expert
Panel
Individual expert reports that
informed the court as it
considered the motions in
limine
Videotaped testimony of court-
appointed experts for
presentation at trial or at
preliminary hearings
Subsequent Use of Primary
Product
Uncertain Videotaped testimony intended
to become part of the record of
each case returned to the
transferor court
Number of Cases in the
Proceeding
≈70 ≈27,000
Time from Start of Selection
to Completion of Duties of
Expert Panel
Approximately four months Three years
Source of Funding Cost shared by the parties Judiciary appropriations with
party payment of discrete
components
Total Cost of the Panel and
Related Expenses
≈ $76,000 ≈ $1,000,000 for the expert panel
> $1,000,000 for special counsels
to represent the experts
29. See Order No. 31K, Protocol for Trial Perpetuation Depositions, Silicone Gel Breast Implants
(No. CV92-P-10000-S) (visited Jan. 29, 2001) <http://earth.fjc.gov/BREIMLIT/ORDERS/order31k.rtf>.
30. See infra Part VIIB and note 193.
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III
IDENTIFICATION AND SELECTION OF EXPERTS
The difficulty in identifying and selecting appropriate individuals presents
an initial barrier to the use of court-appointed experts and technical advisors.31
The problem of finding qualified candidates was compounded in each of the
two cases considered here by the need for specialized experts in multiple areas
of research.  In identifying suitable candidates, both Judge Jones and Judge
Pointer decided to seek the assistance of those with contacts in the science
community.  A number of unexpected problems arose during this process,
which suggests that finding appropriate candidates may be more difficult than
generally believed.  For this reason, the identification and selection process is
discussed in some detail.
A. Hall v. Baxter Healthcare Corp.
In May 1996, prior to a planned Rule 104(a) hearing, Judge Jones identified
four relevant areas of scientific expertise to guide the appointment of experts:
epidemiology, immunology, toxicology, rheumatology, and chemistry.32  He then
appointed Dr. Richard Jones33 as a special master to help him identify scientists
to serve as technical advisors.  After examining the submissions of the parties to
learn about the technical issues in dispute,34 Dr. Jones “sought the names of po-
tential experts from senior faculty at the Oregon Health Sciences University in
each specialty area”35 and from other professional scientific and academic col-
leagues.  He then narrowed the initial pool of approximately seventy-five po-
tential candidates to nine epidemiologists, two immunologists, fourteen rheu-
matologists, and six toxicologists,36 and contacted these potential candidates to
31. In general, federal judges tend to appoint experts with whom they are familiar:  “[I]t is far more
common for judges to appoint experts that they have identified and recruited, often based on previous
personal or professional relationships, than for judges to appoint experts nominated by the parties.”
JOE S. CECIL & THOMAS E. WILLGING, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CTR., COURT-APPOINTED EXPERTS:
DEFINING THE ROLE OF EXPERTS APPOINTED UNDER FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE 31 (1993).
32. See Hall v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 947 F. Supp. 1387, 1392-93 (D. Or. 1996).
33. Dr. Richard Jones, M.D., Ph.D., is Professor Emeritus of the Department of Biochemistry and
Molecular Biology at Oregon Health Sciences University, the former acting president of Oregon
Health Sciences University, and the former chair of the University’s biochemistry department.  Judge
Jones was aware of Dr. Jones’s qualifications, in part, through their relationship as first cousins.  A
number of other interviewees confirmed that Dr. Jones is prominent in the biomedical research
community and would be a likely resource for any judge who wished to identify local experts in certain
areas of science.
34. “The court also instructed counsel to summarize each expert witness’s opinion, to identify all
the materials upon which each expert would rely for his or her opinions, and to submit transcripts of
any testimony given by the witness in similar cases.”  Hall, 947 F.  Supp. at 1392.
35. Richard T. Jones, M.D., Ph.D., Silicone Breast Implant Litigation: Process Used To Identify
and Recommend Neutral Scientific Experts For Federal Rules of Evidence 104(a) Hearings Before the
Honorable Robert E. Jones, U.S. District Court, District of Oregon 1 (Jan. 14, 1996) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with authors).
36. See id. at 2.
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determine their level of interest and availability, as well as the existence of any
bias or conflict.37
Public statements by many local rheumatologists regarding the breast im-
plant litigation complicated the task of identifying a candidate who met the
standards for neutrality.38  Dr. Jones filled the slot after obtaining recommenda-
tions from local rheumatologists for candidates outside the area.
Identifying a technical advisor with knowledge of immunology and toxicol-
ogy was especially difficult.  There are relatively few immunologists and toxi-
cologists compared to other specialties, and many candidates had research and
consulting relationships with defendant companies.  The inability to identify a
suitable toxicologist led Judge Jones to reconsider the nature of the expertise
required on the panel.  Because much of the toxicological evidence depended
on the chemistry of silicone and its products, he determined that a biochemist
would be able to meet this need.
At the conclusion of the screening process, Judge Jones appointed three
technical advisors: Merwyn R. Greenlick39 for epidemiology, Robert F.
Wilkens40 for rheumatology, and Mary Stenzel-Poore41 for immunology and
toxicology.  After the evidentiary hearing, Judge Jones made one additional ap-
pointment:  Ronald McClard42 for biochemistry.  All four appointees were moti-
vated primarily by the opportunity to provide a public service that might lead to
improved use of scientific evidence in the legal system.  In addition, two of the
scientists had cited an intrinsic interest in the scientific issues to be studied re-
garding any possible causal relationship between silicone gel and systemic dis-
37. Throughout this article, the authors cite to information furnished to them in separate
interviews with the participants in the study on the condition that their identities not be disclosed.
Screening for availability and bias was accomplished through telephone conversations.  If a
candidate expressed an interest and was available, Dr. Jones requested a “copy of [the candidate’s]
curriculum vitae and a statement indicating absence of any previous or current involvement with
people or matters related to silicone breast implant litigation.”  Jones, supra note 35, at 3.  One of the
appointees, Dr. Merwyn R. Greenlick, had one previous experience with breast implants, in which he
consulted on the design of an epidemiology study that was undertaken by persons in his academic
department and funded jointly by both plaintiffs and defendants.  This experience, however, was not
deemed to be disqualifying.  
38. See James T. Rosenbaum, Editorial, Silicone Dangers Mired in Ignorance, THE OREGONIAN,
Mar. 27, 1996, at D7.  Dr. Rosenbaum submitted an extensive list of co-authors for his article.  As he
explained:  
The original draft of this letter was circulated to every identifiable rheumatologist in Oregon
and southwest Washington. Eighty-four percent responded to the letter.  Eighty-eight percent
of respondents agreed completely with the contents, and an additional 12 percent agree with
most of the sentiments.  None of the respondents disagreed.
Id.
39. Dr. Greenlick has a Ph.D. in Medical Care Organization and is a professor and chair of the
Department of Public Health and Preventive Medicine at Oregon Health Sciences University.
40. Dr. Wilkins has an M.D. and is a specialist in immunology and toxicology from Seattle,
Washington.
41. Dr. Stenzel-Poore has a Ph.D. in Immunology and is an assistant professor in the Department
of Molecular Microbiology and Immunology at University of Oregon Health Sciences Center.
42. Dr. McClard has a Ph.D. in Biochemistry and is a professor of chemistry at Reed College.
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eases.  The other two appointees cited their respect for Dr. Jones as a major fac-
tor in their decision.
B. In re Silicone Gel Breast Implant Products Liability Litigation
The selection panel used in the national breast implant litigation was ini-
tially developed by Judge Jack B. Weinstein for use in breast implant litigation
in the Eastern and Southern Districts of New York.  In April 1996, Judge Wein-
stein appointed Professors Margaret A. Berger,43 Joel E. Cohen,44 and Alan
Wolf45 as special masters to serve on the selection panel.46  In May 1996, after
granting a motion by the PSC to appoint experts under Rule 706, Judge Pointer
received Judge Weinstein’s permission to adopt his procedure and selection
panel as part of his multidistrict litigation process.47  Judge Pointer then added
three additional members—Dr. Judith L. Craven,48 Dr. Richard Jones,49 and Dr.
Keith Marton50—to give the selection panel broader geographic representation
and to aid in the identification of candidates with national reputations.51  After
an initial in-person meeting of the first three appointees to discuss roles, proce-
dures, and standards for evaluating candidates, all other communication was by
telephone, electronic mail, conventional mail, and fax.  The three panel mem-
bers identified by Judge Pointer never met with the selection panel members
appointed by Judge Weinstein or the nominees for inclusion on the science
panel.  Several selection panel members mentioned the lack of face-to-face
meetings as an impediment to the efficient working of the selection panel.  Like
the experts appointed by Judge Jones in Oregon, the selection panel members
were motivated primarily to serve by the public interest in having a court-
appointed process in which judges and juries can obtain scientific information
that informs their deliberations.  In addition, almost all expressed an intrinsic
interest in the scientific issues to be studied.  One of the original panel members
43. Professor Berger, J.D., Columbia Law School, Professor of Law at Brooklyn Law School, is
widely recognized as one of the nation’s leading authorities on scientific evidentiary issues, in particular
DNA evidence.
44. Professor Cohen is a well-known mathematician and scientist and head of the Laboratory of
Populations at Rockefeller University.
45. Professor Wolf is a professor in the Department of Physics of the Cooper Union, and a
graduate of and adjunct professor at the Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law.
46. See Order No. 31 at 1 & n.1, Appointment of Rule 706 Expert Witnesses, In re Silicone Gel
Breast Implants Prods. Liab. Litig. (MDL 926) (No. CV92-P-10000-S) (visited Jan. 29, 2001)
<http://earth.fjc.gov/BREIMLIT/ORDERS/order31.rtf>.
47. See id. at 1.
48. Dr. Craven is a medical doctor and has a Master’s degree in public health.  She had recently
served as dean of the University of Texas Health Science Center in Houston and was prominent in
discussions of public policy regarding health care issues.
49. Dr. Richard Jones had recently served as a special master for U.S. District Judge Robert Jones
in the Oregon breast implant litigation, as described above.
50. Dr. Kenneth Marton is a medical doctor, a fellow of the American College of Physicians, and
has a background in epidemiology.
51. See Order No. 31, Appointment of Rule 706 Expert Witnesses, Silicone Gel Breast Implants
(No. CV92-P-10000-S) (visited Jan. 29, 2001) <http://earth.fjc.gov/BREIMLIT/ORDERS/order31.rtf>.
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also cited respect for Judge Weinstein as an additional factor in his decision to
serve.
1. Identifying Candidates for Appointment.  At the initial meeting, the three
selection panel members appointed by Judge Weinstein agreed that they would
seek scientists with national reputations who had no significant ties to the
litigation, no significant current or close past relationship with parties to the
litigation, and no significant involvement in research likely to be introduced as
evidence.  After considerable discussion, the panel devised a conflict-of-interest
form and required each expert to sign a copy before being appointed.52
After extensive discussions with Judge Pointer and input from the parties,
the selection panel recommended that four fields be represented by the experts
appointed to the science panel—epidemiology, toxicology, immunology, and
rheumatology.53 As a minimum standard, they agreed to consider only those
candidates who were actively conducting scientific research, thereby excluding
most treating physicians.  In addition, the selection panelists agreed that they
preferred to nominate academic scholars, because the skeptical and independ-
ent perspective traditionally associated with academia was expected to be espe-
cially valuable in this inquiry.  They also preferred scholars who had achieved
the level of full professor to ensure that the experts consulted by the court were
of equal stature with those consulted by the parties.  In addition to scientific ex-
52. A copy of this form is appended to this article.  After reviewing the claims of the parties, the
selection panel members also agreed at this meeting on two standards regarding their own conduct.
First, the selection panel agreed to be open in describing its activities, roles, and meetings, but cautious
about attributing specific statements to identifiable individual scientists.  Second, they agreed to hold
themselves to a standard regarding conflicts of interest that is similar to that which they set for the
scientists they reviewed.  As a result, the members of the selection panel divested themselves and their
immediate families of all financial interests in the approximately twenty or so corporations involved in
the litigation—exclusive of any interests that arose from holdings in undifferentiated mutual funds—
and paid capital gains taxes on the income from such sales.  The selection panel also agreed that
Professor Berger should field any press inquiries and speak on behalf of the group.
53. The selection panel also considered including experts in polymer chemistry, psychiatry, and
oncology in their recommendations.  The panel initially planned to recommend that a statistician be
included on the panel, but the need for such expertise became less urgent in light of the statistical skills
possessed by experts appointed.  Judge Pointer’s order appointing the selection panel notes that the
science panel appointees are expected to have “such familiarity with statistics as may be needed or
desirable to perform their functions and responsibilities.”  Order No. 31 at 4, Appointment of Rule 706
Expert Witnesses, Silicone Gel Breast Implants (No. CV92-P-10000-S) (visited Jan. 29, 2001)
<http://earth.fjc.gov/ BREIMLIT/ORDERS/order31.rtf>.  At its initial meeting, one national science
panel member inquired about regularly consulting with a statistical expert while reviewing existing
studies.  Judge Pointer left open the possibility of hiring a statistical consultant.  The selection panel
determined that an expert in polymer chemistry was unnecessary given the narrow issues that arise
concerning polymer chemistry and the breadth of expertise in related areas on the science panel.  It
also determined that an expert in psychiatry was unnecessary in evaluating a causal relationship
between exposure to silicone breast implant and organic disease.  Judge Pointer’s order permitted the
selection panel to recommend “one or more persons with special expertise in the interrelationship
between the forensic sciences and legal process and procedures, for appointment as Chair of the
Science Panel” and to “perform administrative, coordinating, and consultative services.”  Id. at 3.  The
order did not, however compel the selection panel to “submit findings, be deposed, or present
testimony.”  Id.  The parties objected to the idea that a forensic specialist be appointed to chair the
panel and address its administrative needs, and it was eventually abandoned.  This void was later filled
by the appointment of special counsel and, later, a second special counsel.
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cellence, the committee placed great weight on the ability of the candidate to
communicate findings to a lay audience and the ability to work well in a com-
mittee setting.  The screening panel also sought candidates who were open-
minded about whether there is a causal relationship between the silicone gel in
breast implants and the systemic diseases raised in the litigation.  Previous liti-
gation experience, such as testifying as a party’s expert in the breast implant
litigation or serving on the panel in Oregon, weighed against a candidate be-
cause of the possible appearance of bias or prejudgment.
All six of the panel members used their professional and institutional con-
tacts to identify candidates for the panel to consider.  They also reviewed cur-
riculum vitae, contacted professional references, and gathered other sources of
information about candidates from public sources, including the Internet.  The
process of identifying candidates involved telephone conversations with hun-
dreds of scientists over a six-month period.  The panel sought input from scien-
tists they knew personally and through contacts with professional organizations.
A staff member of the National Academy of Sciences (“NAS”) provided a
valuable list of candidates from members of NAS committees and special study
panels.  Apart from that assistance, efforts to identify candidates by contacting
professional societies and scientific organizations proved fruitless.54  Panel
members also used computerized scientific reference services to identify re-
searchers who were active in examining the general topics that arise in the liti-
gation but who were not committed to a position on a disputed issue.  In addi-
tion, they obtained information on the standing of candidates in the scientific
community from their own networks of scientific and academic colleagues.
In general, personal relationships played an important role in the selection
process.  Members of the original panel had previous professional relationships
with Judge Weinstein.55  All three additional members were referred to Judge
Pointer by federal judges.  Nominees for the science panel, in turn, were identi-
fied by pursuing networks so extensive that some finalists in the process were
three or more steps removed from the selection panel person’s initial contact.
54. The selection panel was wary of seeking nominations from those professional associations that
had taken stands on issues that are the subject of dispute in the breast implant litigation.  For example,
the statement by the American College of Rheumatology that studies show no relationship between
exposure to silicone implants and systemic disease made that entity inappropriate to nominate
candidates for the science panel.  The Selection Panel was also concerned that officers of a professional
association might not be currently active in scientific research.
55. Prior to the appointments, Judge Weinstein had worked professionally with each member of
the panel.  He had collaborated with Professor Berger over the years on a variety of professional
activities, including a well-known treatise on the law of evidence, and had also designated Professor
Berger as a court-appointed expert in the Johns Manville bankruptcy reorganization proceedings.  For
a discussion of that appointment, see In re Joint Eastern and Southern District Asbestos Litig., 129 B.R.
710, 763-64 (E.D.N.Y. 1991).  Among other duties, he asked her to identify scientists to serve on a
separate panel of court-appointed experts that developed forecasts of the volume, type, and timing of
future claims from asbestos-related injuries.  Professor Cohen also participated in the Johns Manville
bankruptcy reorganization.  Judge Weinstein selected him to serve on the expert panel that prepared
forecasts of future asbestos claimants.  Professor Wolf had served as a student intern for Judge
Weinstein while in law school.  Following his internship, Professor Wolf served as an expert for a
private party in the Johns Manville bankruptcy reorganization.
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Personal relationships also played an important role in assessing the scientific
reputations and collegiality of prospective nominees.  Selection panel members
asked those who were likely to know a candidate about his or her professional
standing and temperament.
2. Screening for Conflicts of Interest.  Once a promising candidate was
identified and had indicated an interest in serving, he or she was asked to
submit information required of testifying experts under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 26(a)(2)(B).56  Selection panelists made telephone calls to others in
the field to learn of the candidate’s reputation for scientific rigor and
objectivity.  Extensive searches of Internet and electronic databases were used
to identify publications, professional affiliations, public controversies in which
the candidate had participated, and litigation in which the candidate may have
served as an expert.  Databases of publicly available information regarding
property and financial assets were also examined for potential conflicts.  While
the members of the selection panel were uneasy about inquiring into such
matters, they knew that counsel for the parties would conduct similar
investigations of science panel appointees.  Over 100 hours were spent
conducting electronic network searches for information about potential
candidates.
The most difficult part of the screening process was identifying candidates
who met the panel’s exacting tests for impartiality and did not have conflicts of
interest.  When we asked later about the conflicts screening, those panel mem-
bers who were selected to serve said they did not object to it.  To screen candi-
dates for conflicts, the selection panel used a form modeled on one used by the
NAS.57  The form proved to be a crucial part of the screening process.  It asked
the candidate to certify that the candidate and those with a close relationship to
the candidate did not fall within the definition of an “interested party.”58  An
“interested party” was defined broadly to include factors such as (1) having a
stake in the outcome of the litigation; (2) having the potential to be a litigant in
this case; (3) having close friends or attorneys involved in the litigation; (4)
having a financial interest in one or more corporate defendants; (5) having a
family member or friend working for a party; (6) conducting prior research on
breast implants; (7) receiving funding for research from one of the parties; (8)
making public statements regarding the disputed issues; (9) working as an ex-
56. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26 (a)(2)(B) provides:
[A] disclosure shall . . . be accompanied by a written report prepared and signed by the
witness.  The report shall contain a complete statement of all opinions to be expressed and the
basis and the reasons therefor; the data or other information considered by the witness in
forming the opinions; any exhibits to be used as a summary of or support for the opinions; the
qualifications of the witness, including a list of all publications authored by the witness within
the preceding ten years; the compensation to be paid for the study and testimony; and a listing
of any other cases in which the witness has testified as an expert at trial or by deposition
within the preceding four years.
57. See infra Appendix: Conflict and Bias Screening Questionnaire.
58. See id.
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pert with any party or attorney for any party; or (10) maintaining close associa-
tions with colleagues with ties to a party.59  While candidates for the science
panel were not asked to disclose financial assets, they were given a list of defen-
dants in the litigation and informed that any significant current or past relation-
ship, financial or otherwise with any of the defendants, might raise a conflict-of-
interest question.
Some candidates declined almost immediately, indicating either that they
did not wish to become involved in this area of litigation or in the legal system
in general.  One panel member commented that a few candidates saw little pres-
tige in working with the judicial system, and would have preferred that the re-
quest come from the National Research Council, an organization highly re-
garded by scientists.  This member stated that if science panels are going to
succeed, the scientific community must encourage scientists’ participation in the
judicial process.  Other candidates expressed concern about the amount of time
required.  Many qualified candidates said they had commitments lasting for
years and could not serve on such short notice.  Candidates also were concerned
about the uncertain nature of the time commitment and required assurance that
they would be able to remain productive in their professions.  The selection
panel told the candidates that the commitment would not extend beyond four
to six hours per week for approximately one year, and that Judge Pointer would
relieve them of their obligation if unforeseen circumstances so required.60
Screening for conflicts of interest was difficult and time-consuming.  Many
of those contacted, especially toxicologists, had worked in some capacity for
one or more of the defendant corporations, either conducting research or serv-
ing as a consultant or an expert witness.  Such associations often were not men-
tioned during the telephone conversations.  A number of candidates appeared
to give full consideration to the issue only when presented with the form re-
questing written certification of the absence of a conflict.61  Identifying candi-
dates who were knowledgeable regarding the scientific specialties, yet open-
minded regarding the issues in dispute in the litigation, required a number of
difficult choices.  Many of those most knowledgeable about research on the ef-
fects of breast implants were committed to positions disputed in the litigation,
so they could not be considered.  The selection panel attempted to identify
scholars who had knowledge about relevant areas without having participated
directly in the research or debate over breast implants.  For example, one scien-
tist was familiar with epidemiological studies of breast cancer, but had not re-
59. See id.
60. Almost everyone contacted was curious about the science panel.  At the same time, almost all
candidates had serious reservations about accepting an appointment.  All of those ultimately appointed
to the panel declined to serve at least once during the selection process and were persuaded to
reconsider.
61. One candidate indicated in the telephone conversation that no conflicts existed, then declined
to sign the form after revealing that he had testified on behalf of one of the defendants six months
earlier and received payment in the five-figure range.
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viewed the epidemiological literature regarding alleged problems with breast
implants.
Another example of the selection panel’s concern with the appearance of
commitment to a disputed position was its scrutiny of one panel member’s par-
ticipation on a committee of rheumatologists formed to revise the position
statement of the American College of Rheumatology (“ACR”) on the effects of
breast implants.  In October 1995, the ACR had issued a statement concluding
that “studies provide compelling evidence that silicone implants expose patients
to no demonstrable additional risk for connective tissue or rheumatic disease.”62
In April 1996, Dr. Betty Diamond, at the request of the ACR, agreed to serve
on a panel to reexamine and possibly update that statement.  After reviewing it,
the panel recommended adding the following: “and that additional information
could be expected with regard to non-traditional diseases.”63  In the end, the
ACR decided not to accept the panel’s revision.  Because the contents of the
statement appeared to take no position on the causation issue with regard to
breast implants, the selection panel concluded that her advocacy of a neutral
wait-and-see policy for the College was consistent with her role of assessing the
evidence impartially.
In general, members of both the selection and expert panel reported that
those who accepted the invitation to serve on the science panel were curious
about the process and viewed their service as an opportunity to strengthen the
presentation of scientific information in a judicial forum.  They also placed
great weight on the fact that they would be furthering a public interest by serv-
ing as court expert.  None seemed motivated by traditional professional re-
search interests, because service on the science panel would likely limit the op-
portunity for traditional scientific achievement during the time of service.
Panelists were assured that they could write about their experience upon com-
pletion of their service.
Even though the selection panel was permitted to nominate multiple candi-
dates, the panel decided to nominate only one scientist for each position.64  In
each case, the selection panel unanimously believed that the nominated indi-
vidual was the best available for the job.  Ultimately, the selection panel nomi-
nated and the court accepted as the members of the national science panel: Dr.
Betty A. Diamond65 for immunology, Dr. Barbara S. Hulka66 for epidemiology,
62. See Rosenbaum, supra note 38, at D7.
63. See supra note 37.
64. One expert panel member wished that two people had been appointed from each scientific
discipline so that each finding would have been based on the consensus of two experts.  Had this
proposal been accepted, it would have potentially doubled the cost of the panel.
65. Dr. Diamond is a professor in the Department of Microbiology and Immunology at Albert
Einstein College of Medicine in Bronx, New York.
66. Dr. Hulka is the Kenan Professor at the Department of Epidemiology at the School of Public
Health at the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill.
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Dr. Nancy I. Kerkvliet67 for toxicology, and Dr. Peter Tugwell68 for rheumatol-
ogy.
IV
INSTRUCTIONS TO THE EXPERT PANEL
Producing a written report was an important objective of both the Oregon
and MDL procedures.  In the Oregon litigation, the report was the primary
product of the expert panel.  In the MDL process, the report served to give fo-
cus and structure to the experts’ videotaped testimony.  The courts’ instructions
to the expert panel members in both proceedings were intended to define the
experts’ tasks and to establish a procedure to assist them in carrying out their
tasks.  Judge Jones designed his instructions to guide the experts in creating a
report that would help him decide whether to exclude plaintiffs’ scientific evi-
dence at the pretrial stage.69  Judge Pointer’s instructions were designed to assist
the experts in reviewing the scientific literature, producing a written report, and
providing testimony for federal and state breast implant trials nationwide.70
Several experts in the MDL proceeding, however, thought that their report
would be the major product and were surprised to learn that they would have to
be deposed, even though the court’s Order 31, which preceded their appoint-
ment, clearly stated that videotaped depositions would be the ultimate prod-
ucts.  All of the experts in both cases noted that many of their concerns should
be expected when “naïve” scientists or physicians, without previous experience
as experts, participate in a judicial process with which they are not familiar.
In this section, we describe the scope of the instructions in these two cases,
consider similarities and differences between them, and highlight issues and
concerns raised.  The instructions differed in several ways, including timing, the
definition of the experts’ duties, and the extent to which the initial instructions
were supplemented.  As both the Oregon and MDL processes unfolded, clarifi-
cation or elaboration of several instructions or questions became necessary.
During interviews, participants in both processes emphasized the need for
clearer instructions and more guidance from the court.
67. Dr. Kerkvliet is a professor and extension toxicology specialist in the Department of
Agricultural Chemistry at Oregon State University in Corvallis, Oregon.
68. Dr. Tugwell is a professor and the chairman of the Department of Medicine at the University
of Ottawa in Ottawa.
69. See Hall v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 947 F. Supp. 1387, 1393 (D. Or. 1996).
70. See Order No. 31, Appointment of Rule 706 Expert Witnesses, In re Silicone Gel Breast
Implants Prods. Liab. Litig. (MDL 926) (No. CV92-P-10000-S) (visited Jan. 29, 2001)
<http://earth.fjc.gov/ BREIMLIT/ORDERS/order31.rtf>; Order No. 31E, Directions to National
Science Panel under FRE 706, Silicone Gel Breast Implants (MDL 926), 793 F. Supp. 1098 (J.P.M.L.
1992) (No. CV92-P-10000-S) (visited Jan. 29, 2001) <http:// earth.fjc.gov/BREIMLIT/ORDERS/order
31e.rtf>.
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A. Hall v. Baxter Healthcare Corp.
Judge Jones instructed the technical advisors to assist him in determining
whether the parties’ expert testimony rested on reliable scientific methodology.
At a pretrial hearing, Judge Jones, the special master, and three of the technical
advisors asked the parties’ expert witnesses questions about the basis of their
testimony.71  Following this hearing, Judge Jones asked each counsel to propose
questions for the technical advisors.72  After reviewing the submissions, Judge
Jones drafted the following five questions:
1) Is the expert’s opinion supported by scientific reasoning and methodology that is
generally accepted in the expert’s particular scientific community or otherwise quali-
fied?
2) Is the expert’s opinion based upon scientifically reliable data?
3) If epidemiological studies have not been done or are inconclusive, what other data,
such as animal studies, biophysical data, clinical experience in the field, medical rec-
ords, differential diagnosis, preliminary studies, general scientific knowledge, and
medical literature can justify, to a reasonable medical probability, a conclusion con-
cerning the cause of the syndrome or disease at issue?
4) Do the methodology and data support the expert’s conclusions?
5) Do the scientific data relied upon by the expert apply to the syndrome or disease at
issue in these cases? For instance, are epidemiological studies directed at other typical
or classical diseases relevant to an atypical disease? 73
The questions were intended to guide the advisors as they considered issues of
relevancy, fit, and validity of plaintiffs’ experts’ evidence.74
Dr. Jones indicated that he and the advisors would have welcomed more de-
finitive instructions from the court earlier in the process, especially due to their
unfamiliarity with judicial procedures. 75  One advisor said, “The most difficult
part was knowing the assignment.”  Another called for “better instructions as to
our specific duties.”  A third observed that “the lack of guidance regarding the
task created confusion,” and the fourth found that “changing expectations re-
garding what was expected of us complicated our assignment.”  Dr. Jones ac-
knowledged, however, that providing such instruction was made more difficult
because of the evolving nature of the process.
The fourth question—“Does the methodology and data support the expert’s
conclusion?”—generated considerable commentary from the advisors and the
parties’ counsel.  This instruction incorporates the Supreme Court’s direction in
Daubert v. Merrill Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., that in assessing whether the ba-
sis for expert testimony is scientifically valid, the court must focus “solely on
71. See Hall, 947 F. Supp. at 1393.
72. See id.
73. Id.
74. In addition to the judge’s five questions, the court included all but one of counsels’ proposed
twenty or so questions and instructed the advisors to respond to any that they thought would help the
court in its gatekeeping role.
75. See supra note 37 regarding information from confidential author interviews.
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principles and methodology, not on the conclusions that they generate.”76  From
a scientist’s perspective, however, there is no clear delineation between meth-
odology and conclusion; the methods frame the conclusion, which then leads to
alternative methods for the next study.  The attorneys created further confusion
by attempting to clarify the distinction between methodology and conclusion.
One attorney, for example, urged the advisors “to consider only the methodol-
ogy, not the conclusions,” but went on to discuss the conclusions.
Judge Jones agreed that the methodology/conclusion distinction under
Daubert presented a difficult issue.  Anticipating the Supreme Court’s resolu-
tion of this issue, he indicated in his opinion that
[t]here appears to be no clear demarcation between scientific methodology and the
conclusions it generates.  Daubert I acknowledged this much, recognizing that science
is a process, not “an encyclopedic body of knowledge.”  This court need not and
should not ignore any step in the process, but must ensure that in each step, from ini-
tial premise to ultimate conclusion, the expert faithfully followed valid scientific
methodology.  In other words, this court need not accept, as scientifically reliable, any
conclusion that good science does not permit to be drawn from the underlying data
but, which, instead constitutes “unsupported speculation.”77
Dr. Jones commented that distinguishing between methodology and conclusion
is difficult when the findings involve a chain of reasoning that is tied to research
methods.  He argued that scientists should be permitted to comment on the va-
lidity of inferences and conclusions, because a valid method may be applied in-
appropriately.
Judge Jones asked Dr.  Richard Jones to continue to serve as special master
after the appointment of the expert panel.  On occasion, Dr. Jones served as an
intermediary, fielding questions from the panel members and bringing those
questions to Judge Jones or the parties.  This approach reduced instances of ex
parte communication with Judge Jones78 and allowed for instruction of the ex-
76. 509 U.S. 579, 595 (1993).
77. Hall, 947 F. Supp. at 1401 (citation omitted) (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590).  Following
Hall, the Supreme Court addressed this issue:
But conclusions and methodology are not entirely distinct from one another.  Trained experts
commonly extrapolate from existing data.  But nothing in either Daubert or the Federal Rules
of Evidence requires a district court to admit opinion evidence which is connected to existing
data only by the ipse dixit of the expert.  A court may conclude that there is simply too great
an analytical gap between the data and the opinion proffered.
Joiner v. General Electric Co., 522 U.S. 136, 146 (1997).
78. In general, case law and canons of judicial ethics discourage any type of ex parte
communication regarding substantive matters between the judge and court-appointed experts acting as
witnesses during the course of litigation.  See CECIL & WILLGING, supra note 31, at 39-43.  When the
expert serves as a technical advisor, and therefore as a consultant to a judge, ex parte communication
with the judge sometimes occurs.  But even here, appellate courts have cautioned that judges should
follow certain procedural safeguards.  See Reilly v. United States, 863 F.2d 149, 158-60 (1st Cir. 1988)
(holding that the ground rules governing communication with a technical advisor included advising
parties if the expert ranged into an area not discussed in the briefs; and recommending the inclusion of
a comprehensive job description on the record and the submission of an affidavit of the expert’s
compliance with the ground rules at the end of the appointment).
HOOPER_FMT.DOC 06/04/01  1:40 PM
Page 139: Autumn 2001]  CAUSATION IN BREAST IMPLANT LITIGATION 157
perts in their tasks while permitting Judge Jones to maintain sufficient distance
from the work of the panel.79
B. In re Silicone Gel Breast Implant Products Liability Litigation
After issuing the written instructions,80 Judge Pointer held a two-day orien-
tation conference, which included an overview of the events leading to the ex-
perts’ appointment and a description of their roles and responsibilities.81
Stressing that the experts were not being asked to perform independent re-
search or to examine patients, Judge Pointer called upon them to look at the
various scientific studies and reports and to make professional judgments as to
whether they could ascertain a reliable scientific basis within their disciplines
for drawing certain conclusions, such as whether implants cause or exacerbate
specified conditions.82
In his written instructions Judge Pointer asked the court-appointed experts
to respond to the following questions:
(a)Issues.  To what extent, if any, and with what limitations and caveats do existing
studies, research, and reported observations provide a reliable and reasonable scien-
tific basis for one to conclude that silicone-gel breast implants cause or exacerbate any
of the conditions described in (b) below? If, in the process of making these findings,
you believe that there are related or subordinate issues that should be separately ad-
dressed, please do so.
(b)Scope.  You are asked at this time to consider the relationship, if any, between im-
plants and the following:
i) “classic” connective tissue diseases, such as systemic lupus erythematosus,
Sjögren’s syndrome, etc.
ii) “atypical” presentations of connective tissue diseases or symptoms
79. We are aware of no instances of direct communication between Judge Jones and the expert
panelists regarding substantive matters.  In one instance, however, an expert sought clarification of a
statement regarding precision of a certain measurement that had been relied upon at the preliminary
hearing.  When Judge Jones declined to reopen the record to clarify this issue, the expert on his own
initiative contacted the manufacturer of the laboratory instrument to determine if it was capable of
making the disputed measurement.  This approach amounted to an indirect form of ex parte
communication with the decisionmaker.
80. Federal Rule of Evidence 706(a) requires written instructions or a conference with the court’s
experts.
81. Transcript of National Science Panel Hearing, Oct. 24, 1996, In re Silicone Gel Breast Implants
Prods. Liab. Litig. (MDL 926), 793 F. Supp. 1098 (J.P.M.L. 1992) (No. CV92-P-10000-S) [hereinafter
Transcript].
82. Id. at 13-14.  The parties were allowed to participate in drafting the instructions.  Before the
orientation conference, Judge Pointer discussed the experts’ duties with parties’ counsel, and the
attorneys reviewed and commented on the court’s proposed instructions.  Judge Pointer included many
of the parties’ suggestions, but limited the number of systemic injury symptoms for the experts to
consider to approximately twenty-five.  Listed in the appendix of the court’s order were various
diseases, symptoms, conditions, and complaints sometimes asserted as possibly associated with silicone-
gel implants.  The experts were encouraged to comment on the scientific basis, if any, for this claimed
linkage.  They were not asked to consider purely local complications, such as breast disfigurement,
tenderness, or capsular contracture.  See Order No. 31E, Directions to National Science Panel under
FRE 706, Silicone Gel Breast Implants (No. CV92-P-10000-S) (visited Jan. 29, 2001)
<http://earth.fjc.gov/BREIMLIT/ ORDERS/order31e.rtf>.
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iii) immune system dysfunctions
     . . .
(c) Contrary Opinions.  To what extent, if any, should any of your opinions referenced
in (a) above be considered as subject to sufficient genuine dispute as would permit
other persons, generally qualified in your field of expertise, to express opinions that,
though contrary to yours, would likely be viewed by others in the field as representing
legitimate and responsible disagreement within your profession?83
During the conference, the experts were given an opportunity to review and
comment on the court’s proposed instructions.  They were asked to point out
any issues that were not clear and indicate whether they felt comfortable per-
forming the tasks outlined in the instructions.  The experts expressed no reser-
vations regarding the instructions at that time.
Judge Pointer also instructed panel members orally on the procedures to be
followed regarding consultation among themselves, consultation with authors of
studies, obtaining special assistance or advice from other experts, preparation of
reports, and procedures for presenting deposition testimony.84  As reported be-
low, some of these oral instructions were unclear to the experts and counsel.
Throughout the process, issues arose about proper communication between
the judge and panel, and among panel and non-panel members.  In an early or-
der, litigants and implant recipients, their counsel, and their potential lay or ex-
pert witnesses were enjoined from directly communicating with any of the
members of the panel regarding issues in breast-implant litigation.85
Judge Pointer initially anticipated appointing a fifth panel member to serve
as an administrator and coordinator of the panel activities.  He also anticipated
communicating directly with the panel members, but defense counsel objected
to direct communications, fearing that such communication would compromise
the work of the panel.86  Also, it soon became clear that the experts’ lack of fa-
miliarity with the legal process, and the deposition process in particular, made it
necessary to appoint counsel to represent their interests in those proceedings.
Consequently, in January 1997, Judge Pointer appointed John M. Kobayashi to
act as “special, independent, and private counsel to the members of the Na-
tional Science Panel.”87  Mr. Kobayashi was authorized to contact parties, their
counsel, and the court, singly or in combination, “mindful, however, of the obli-
83. Order No. 31E, Directions to National Science Panel under FRE 706, Silicone Gel Breast
Implants (No. CV92-P-10000-S) (visited Jan. 29, 2001) <http://earth.fjc.gov/BREIMLIT/ORDERS/or-
der31e.rtf>.
84. See Transcript, supra note 81.
85. See Order No. 31D, Appointing Additional Member of National Science Panel and Precluding
Ex Parte Communications with Panel Members, Silicone Gel Breast Implants (No. CV92-P-10000-S)
(visited on Jan. 29, 2001) <http://earth.fjc.gov/ BREIMLIT/ORDERS/order31d.rtf>.
86. See, e.g., Edgar v. K.L., 93 F.3d 256, 256 (7th Cir. 1996) (addressing judge’s action in meeting ex
parte with panel of experts appointed by judge; action was grounds for disqualification of judge).
87. Order No. 31F, Appointment of Special Counsel to National Science Panel, Silicone Gel Breast
Implants (No. CV92-P-10000-S) (visited Jan. 29, 2001) <http://earth.fjc.gov/BREIMLIT/ORDERS
/order31f.rtf>.
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gation not to engage in communications that might be viewed as inappropriate
ex parte communications involving substantive matters.”88
Judge Pointer ordered that all communication between panel members and
special counsel would be subject to the attorney-client privilege.89  Mr. Kobaya-
shi also delivered communications to the expert panel members from Judge
Pointer, including those regarding administrative matters such as billing, pay-
ment, and scheduling hearings.  In a few instances, Judge Pointer and the ex-
perts spoke directly when communication between the experts and special
counsel appeared to break down.  Several of the experts had difficulty contact-
ing Mr. Kobayashi, so they called Judge Pointer’s chambers directly with their
questions and requests.  Occasionally, when discussing administrative matters
with a member of Judge Pointer’s staff, an expert would raise a substantive
question.  Judge Pointer reported these contacts and the substance of his re-
sponse to the parties.  Attorneys for the defendants, who initially objected to a
proposal permitting ex parte communications between Judge Pointer and the
expert panel members, reported that this process worked well.  Attorneys for
the plaintiffs had not objected to the initial proposal, and expressed no concerns
about this ex parte communication between Judge Pointer and the experts.
There was one known instance of direct contact between a panel member
and a party, in which the panel member appeared on a symposium panel unre-
lated to breast implants that was organized and sponsored by one of the defen-
dants.  This interaction became the topic of an extended hearing, discussed in
Part V.
Participants provided a range of comments regarding the court’s oral and
written instructions.  Generally, the panel expressed confusion about how to
conduct their work, frustration about restrictions on their day-to-day activities,
and concern about the confidentiality of their notes and conversations.  One
expert commented that the oral instructions seemed fine initially, but the panel
later realized that all instructions should have been written and affirmed by all
involved.  Some panelists had difficulties even with the court’s written instruc-
tions.  According to one panel member,
they were precise from a legal standpoint, but the panel had to work hard to figure out
what the questions really were.  Only then could [the panel] decide who would cover
what area.  There were a lot of options for organizing the work, and the way we did it
is only one of many possibilities.  What we ended up with, though, was appropriate
and it was appropriate for the court to leave it to us to figure out how to organize our
work.
Another panel member commented that they were told to be careful about
drafts, but she was not aware that this would extend to scribbling notes on arti-
cles.  At the outset, Judge Pointer had advised the panel members to revise
their computer-based drafts, as he does, without saving the old ones.  Judge
88. Id.
89. See id.
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Pointer, however, said that he could not advise them whether earlier drafts
would or would not have to be produced.
The experts agreed that the initial screening for conflicts of interest was
done in good faith but did not anticipate issues that arose later.  One expert
commented that the court should have had written instructions on conflicts of
interest.  Having such a section would have minimized a lot of the confusion
surrounding appropriate communications with parties and nonparties.  Several
experts noted that, as time passed, the definition of what seemed to be a conflict
changed.  Judge Pointer agreed, noting that more time should have been spent
preparing special instructions on conflicts and periodically reemphasizing these
issues.  At the same time, he feared that a more detailed instruction regarding
conflicts could overstate the problem of communication with representatives of
the parties and might have discouraged the selected experts from serving.  In
fact, had such a provision been in place, at least one expert would not have
served on the panel.
The attorneys on both sides also had concerns about the instructions.  One
plaintiffs’ attorney thought that Judge Pointer’s oral instruction implied that the
experts were entitled to keep their opinions, correspondence, and other com-
munications secret.  This attorney thought that the experts should have had no
more protection than any other party’s expert.  In the attorney’s opinion, it was
inappropriate for the court to allow the experts to work together as a group and
keep their deliberations secret.  Another plaintiffs’ attorney thought the instruc-
tions were clear except for the standard of proof question.  The attorney was
concerned that Judge Pointer instructed the panel members to apply the stan-
dard of proof used in their respective fields.  As a result, panel members used
the scientific standard, which requires greater certainty than the legal standard
of a preponderance of the evidence.  This attorney believed the scientific stan-
dard was the wrong standard to use.
On the other side, several defendants’ attorneys thought the first question
concerning causation issues was fine but that the second question regarding ac-
ceptable minority views was not sufficiently clear.  These attorneys thought the
court was asking the panel to criticize other scientists and their methods, an un-
common practice among scientists.
V
COLLECTING SCIENTIFIC INFORMATION AND PRODUCING THE REPORTS
In this section, we discuss the information on which the report was based,
the form of the report, the experts’ division of labor, the need for assistance and
expertise, administrative matters relating to the production of the report, and
the attorneys’ perceptions of the attorneys about the usefulness of the report.
A. Hall v. Baxter Healthcare Corp.
In the Oregon litigation, the advisors received scientific information in three
ways.  First, Judge Jones structured a four-day pretrial hearing on the admissi-
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bility of expert evidence, with one day devoted to each of the four subject mat-
ter areas.90  During the hearing, the experts and the special master listened as
the parties’ experts presented their views in narrative form.  Opposing counsel
then cross-examined the experts, but without evidentiary objections.  Judge
Jones limited opposing counsel’s questions to those addressing science issues,
ruling out questions regarding bias and funding of the research.  Judge Jones
and the technical advisors also asked questions of the parties’ experts about the
basis of their testimony.
Second, following the hearing, the parties provided the panel of advisors
with numerous boxes of articles and other written materials.  The technical ad-
visors were initially overwhelmed by the amount of material to be reviewed in a
brief period of time.  According to one advisor, the material submitted by the
parties should have been better organized.91  The advisors did not feel they re-
ceived the guidance needed to undertake their review.
Third, Judge Jones ordered the parties to prepare videotaped summations
for the technical advisors, allowing each side thirty minutes per discipline and
allowing plaintiffs forty minutes for rebuttal.92
To assist the technical advisors and minimize ex parte communication,
Judge Jones asked Dr. Jones to continue to serve as special master following
appointment of the expert panel.  Dr. Jones assisted the technical advisors by
(1) offering guidance regarding their tasks, which involved interpreting the
court’s instructions in some instances; (2) contacting Judge Jones with questions
about communications with other scientists; and (3) reviewing drafts of reports
to ensure they were responsive to the court’s questions and understandable to a
non-scientist.93  Judge Jones’ questions provided some structure for developing
the report, but since he required that the advisors prepare separate reports and
not exchange reports prior to submission to the court, the advisors only needed
to communicate to decide how to divide specific topics among the panel mem-
bers.  Two experts with overlapping areas of expertise discussed how they
should divide certain issues involving both immunology and rheumatology but
ultimately worked independently.  The advisors found the lack of specific guid-
ance regarding the relationship between methodology and conclusions and the
treatment of minority viewpoints especially problematic.  In the end, the advi-
sors’ separate reports included inconsistent views.
90. See Hall v.  Baxter Healthcare Corp., 947 F. Supp. 1387, 1393 (D. Or. 1996).
91. See supra note 37.
92. See Hall, 947 F. Supp. at 1393.
93. As a result of Dr. McClard’s late appointment, he had only a few weeks to prepare his report.
Understandably, he had a great number of questions about the evidentiary hearing and report
preparation.  Consequently, Dr. Jones worked more closely with Dr. McClard than with the other
technical advisors.  He answered Dr. McClard’s general questions, such as how to locate items in the
court record. Dr. Jones offered no opinion or judgment regarding the merits of the issues in dispute,
but he did help focus Dr. McClard’s inquiry on the relevant issues.  Further, Dr. Jones also reviewed a
draft of Dr. McClard’s opinion and suggested minor revisions to several phrases that he thought might
be misunderstood.
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B. In re Silicone Gel Breast Implant Products Liability Litigation
In the MDL proceedings, the experts also received information in three
ways.  First, Judge Pointer arranged a three-day conference at which the party
experts presented their views and engaged in informal discussions with the
panel members.94  Subsequently, the panel members, with the assistance of spe-
cial counsel, convened a conference of scientists in Washington, D.C., which
Judge Pointer attended.  Second, the experts reviewed articles and other written
materials transmitted through the special counsel’s office.  In all, the parties
submitted over thirty-five linear feet of written material, the bulk of which was
presented to the experts.95  At Judge Pointer’s urging, the parties formulated
priority lists of forty articles per expert for each side and a “top 100” listing
overall.  Third, each of the experts conducted his or her own searches.  Such
searches rarely turned up information that the parties did not provide as part of
their submissions.  At the trial deposition stage, the parties listed hundreds of
additional articles as possible bases for cross-examination.  Nevertheless, this
independent search assured panel members that their opinions were based on a
thorough review of the literature.
1. Individual Versus Joint Reports.  In his initial instructions to the selection
panel, Judge Pointer recommended that each expert prepare an individual
report, drawing on other panelists’ expertise, as soon as all or a discrete portion
of the assignment had been contemplated and an initial finding could be made.96
This instruction was intended to create an identifiable body of work linked to
each panel member to frame his or her direct testimony and focus any cross-
examination.  As the work evolved, the panelists combined their individual
efforts into a single report after they agreed that there was no reasonable and
reliable scientific basis to conclude that silicone gel breast implants cause or
exacerbate the specified diseases.  Thus, there was little or no reason for
separate reports.  To address the need for individual accountability, each
panelist wrote a separate chapter.  All four panelists then signed the final report
and linked their findings by an executive summary that included an
introductory section explaining the common background for the report.  The
executive summary concluded with a joint statement responding to Judge
Pointer’s question about opinions contrary to those of the panel members.97
There was considerable overlap in the qualifications and disciplines of the
panel members.  Although Dr. Diamond was appointed as an immunologist and
94. See Transcript of Rule 706 Panel Hearing Before the Honorable Sam C. Pointer, Jr. (July 22-
24, 1997) (on file with authors).
95. The panel expressed concern about the volume of material it received and the length of time it
took to review the documents.  Initially, the panel was given eleven large boxes containing thousands of
documents.
96. See Order No. 31, Appointment of Rule 706 Expert Witnesses, In re Silicone Gel Breast
Implants Prods. Liab. Litig. (MDL 926), 793 F. Supp. 1098 (J.P.M.L. 1992) (No. CV92-P-10000-S)
(visited Jan. 29, 2001) <http://earth.fjc.gov/BREIMLIT/ORDERS/order31.rtf>.
97. See National Science Panel, supra note 15, at 8.
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Dr.  Kerkvliet as a toxicologist, both dealt with immune system responses to
foreign substances.  They divided the labor so that Dr. Diamond considered re-
search on human immunology and Dr. Kerkvliet examined animal studies.
Also, Dr. Hulka was appointed as an epidemiologist and Dr. Tugwell as a
rheumatologist.  To address rheumatological issues, however, Dr. Tugwell re-
lied primarily on epidemiological methods.  Each of their separate chapters re-
flected similar methods and analyses.98
2. Communications Among Panel Members and with Colleagues.  Judge
Pointer indicated that the panel members were free to communicate with each
other as needed.99  Mr. Kobayashi, special counsel, was concerned that the
subject of such communication could become a topic for discovery.  He
attempted to bring these communications into the protection of attorney-client
privilege by setting up a special telephone line and urging the panel members to
communicate with each other only when an attorney from his office was on the
line.  The experts found this restriction both awkward and inconvenient and
soon began to engage in direct telephone and e-mail communications.  The
experts needed this communication to coordinate their work on a single
comprehensive report.
Another point of tension between Mr. Kobayashi and the panel members
involved the experts communicating with colleagues not serving on the panel as
they reviewed the literature and prepared their report.  Because the panel
members had not conducted research on the effects of silicone gel breast im-
plants, they wished to consult with others who were experienced in this area.
At the first meeting in Birmingham, one panel member asked Judge Pointer
about consulting with colleagues not involved in the litigation and was told that
such consultations were permissible if the researchers recorded the inquiries in
a log.100  If the panel member wished to ask questions of an author of one of the
papers being reviewed for the litigation, the inquiry could involve questions to
clarify an understanding of data in a research study, but not an interpretation of
the data.  Making this distinction, however, proved difficult.101
The experts in Judge Pointer’s litigation found that these constraints dis-
couraged occasional consultation with colleagues.102  The panel member who
went through the preclearance process to contact two persons in her academic
department was later surprised to learn that their identities were reported to
the parties’ attorneys.  After that, she was reluctant to approach colleagues for
fear of involving them in the litigation.  Other panel members did not contact
colleagues, either because they were concerned or confused about the condi-
98. See id. at 2.
99. See Transcript of National Science Panel Hearing Held Before the Honorable Sam C.  Pointer,
Jr., at 27 (Oct. 24, 1996) (on file with authors) [hereinafter Science Panel Hearing].
100. See id. at 55-56.
101. See supra note 37.
102. The need for such consultations was mitigated by the Washington, D.C. hearing.  See Science
Panel Hearing, supra note 99.
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tions governing such contacts, or because they wanted to develop their inde-
pendent judgment of the issues.  One panel member suggested clearer rules and
a document they could send to colleagues that would set forth the extent of
their involvement and the consequences of responding to an inquiry by a panel
member.
3. The Expert Panel’s Report.  In November 1998, the panel members
produced a report consisting of four chapters, each written by one panel
member, linked by a common introduction, conclusion, and executive
summary.103  There was a general consensus among the panel members with
respect to causation issues and the possible effects of exposure to silicone gel.104
Specifically, the toxicologist concluded that “[t]he preponderance of data from
[animal] studies indicate [sic] that silicone implants do not alter incidence or
severity of autoimmune disease.”105  Also, “[c]onsidering the broad range of
testing systems that have been used in the study of silicone effects, the
toxicologic and immunologic responses are few in number and questionable in
significance.”106  The immunologist found that many of the studies available for
analysis were methodologically inadequate, with ill-defined or inappropriate
comparison subjects or unorthodox data analyses.107  Because of these
limitations, among others, she concluded from existing studies that women with
silicone breast implants do not display a silicone-induced systemic abnormality
in the types or functions of cells of the immune system.108  The epidemiologist
found “no association . . . between breast implants and any of the individual
connective tissue diseases, all definite connective diseases combined, or the
other autoimmune/rheumatic conditions.”109  Finally, the rheumatologist found
problems with many of the studies.
[T]he same complaint appeared in more than one disease category; self-report was not
verified; timing of the complaint in relation to the implant was not known; indication
for the implant was ignored; and in individual studies, the number of affected women
was small.  Furthermore, many of the rheumatologic complaints reported are common
in the general population and .  .  .  in physicians’ offices.  No distinctive features re-
lating to silicone breast implants could be identified.110
4. Attorneys’ Views of the Usefulness of the Report.  Attorneys’ views about
the usefulness of the report were directly related to the extent to which the
report supported their claims.  In general, for the reasons discussed below,
attorneys for defendants found the report and the videotaped testimony
extremely useful, and expected to use them in any trials about systemic issues
103. See National Science Panel, supra note 15.
104. See id. at 4-8.
105. Id  at 4.
106. Id. at 5.
107. See id. at 5–6.
108. See id. at 6.
109. Id. at 6.
110. Id. at 7.
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and in any Daubert hearings that might precede these trials.111  On the other
hand, as discussed below, attorneys for plaintiffs think the report and testimony
are worth very little and expect to challenge their use at every juncture.112
Attorneys on both sides have doubts about the life expectancy of the report and
testimony.113
All defendants’ attorneys, and even one plaintiffs’ attorney, found that the
report matched the issues in the litigation well, but other plaintiffs’ attorneys
identified a number of gaps in the report.  For example, one argued that the ex-
perts ignored significant studies.114  Others believed the absence of views from a
pathologist or a polymer chemist to be fatal.  Still another attorney focused on
the absence of clinical findings, arguing that the report, by its terms, addressed
the general causation issues only in terms of existing scientific research, and
could not be used to exclude clinical evidence that illnesses arose following the
implants and were cured when the implants were removed.  All agree that, ex-
cept in extraordinary circumstances, the report itself will not be independently
admissible as evidence.  A plaintiffs’ attorney would argue that the report “is
not the type of information that an expert would ordinarily rely on.”  Further-
more, “an expert relying on the report would have to answer some very difficult
questions.”  Another attorney noted that the utility of the report and video-
taped testimony is limited, because they relate entirely to evidence of systemic
injuries and do not consider local injuries.  Plaintiffs plan to emphasize local
injuries, which they believe are present in many, if not all, of the remaining
cases.
VI
DISCOVERY AND DEPOSITIONS OF THE EXPERTS
Candidates for appointment as experts often express concern about the ex-
tent to which their opinions will be subject to deposition and cross-examination.
Scientists view a proper inquiry as limited to the opinions and information ex-
pressed in the research report, especially where the experts are court-appointed
and are unlikely to have been influenced by contact with the parties.115  Any in-
quiry into factors not directly related to the report, such as the personal motiva-
tions of the researcher or opinions on matters outside the report, is regarded as
111. In addition, some defendants’ attorneys thought the report would dissuade plaintiffs’ experts
from testifying because it stripped away any professional basis for their previous testimony.
112. Some plaintiffs’ attorneys, for example, thought that the report did not adequately deal with
reliable findings of clinicians, pathologists, chemists, and other professionals not represented on the
panel.
113. Attorneys were aware that a then-pending National Institutes of Health study might alter the
basis for the national panel’s conclusion.  See Louise A.  Brinton et al., Breast Cancer Following
Augmentation Mammoplasty, 11 CANCER CAUSES & CONTROL 819 (2000).
114. See supra note 37.
115. See Order No. 31L, Denying Plaintiffs’ “Motion for Relief from Prejudicial Bias,” Apr. 25,
1999, at 14, In re Silicone Gel Breast Implants Prods. Liab. Litig. (MDL 926), 793 F. Supp. 1098
(J.P.M.L. 1992) (No. CV92-P-10000-S) (visited Jan. 29, 2001) <http://earth.fjc.gov/BREIMLIT/
ORDERS/order31l.rtf>.
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an unnecessary attack on the integrity of the individual.116  In both of these
cases, the court fashioned a compromise procedure that permitted the attorneys
to inquire into the bases of the expert panel members’ opinions while con-
straining the inquiry relative to its traditional scope.
A. Hall v. Baxter Healthcare Corp.
Judge Jones did not contemplate depositions of the experts, because they
were to serve as technical advisors, not witnesses.  Judge Jones appointed the
experts pursuant to a court’s inherent authority to seek technical advice and as-
sistance and, thus, concluded that the requirements of Rule 706 relating to
depositions, testimony, and cross-examination did not apply.117
Three days after the technical advisors submitted their reports, the court
conducted a hearing at which parties’ counsel questioned the advisors.118  Judge
Jones clarified that this hearing was not a deposition, but rather a chance for the
attorneys to ask questions about the bases of the advisors’ reports.  Almost all
of the plaintiffs’ attorneys, and a number of defense attorneys, thought that this
hearing did not provide an adequate opportunity to question the advisors about
their findings and conclusions.  Similarly, one technical advisor believed the
hearing was not a true “cross-examination”119 and thought that he and the other
advisors should have been deposed.  Upon reflection, Judge Jones thought that
having advisors provide testimony in open court may have created some confu-
sion regarding their role, because advisors who serve as court consultants are
not generally deposed; but he was still satisfied with the workings of the proc-
ess.
B. In re Silicone Gel Breast Implant Products Liability Litigation
Judge Pointer sought to create an informal atmosphere that would be com-
fortable for the experts, while giving the parties the opportunity to discover in-
formation relevant to the videotaped trial depositions that were to follow a
couple of months later.120
1. Discovery Deposition Format.  Judge Pointer established the ground
rules for and presided at discovery depositions conducted in a law firm’s
conference room.  These depositions were transcribed by a court reporter, but
were not videotaped.  Each side was allowed a maximum of three hours to
examine each witness.  Only one attorney from each side was permitted to
question a given panel member.  Panelists were allowed to be present while the
116. See id.
117. See Hall v.  Baxter Healthcare Corp., 947 F. Supp. 1387, 1392 n.8 (D. Or. 1996).
118. See id. at 1394.
119. See supra note 37.
120. As the MDL judge presiding over a national docket of cases, Judge Pointer had to be
concerned that a ruling or other limitation on cross-examination could render the deposition testimony
inadmissible at trial.  Multiple standards might apply in various trial courts in which the testimony
might be used.
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others testified.  Before the depositions, counsel were ordered to submit general
wording of all questions to be asked each witness, and copies of these questions
were provided to the witnesses.121  If a question referred to an article not cited in
the report, a copy of that article was to be attached to the request.  In all,
counsel asked the experts hundreds of questions, ranging from detailed
questions about particular studies to general questions about the panelist’s
background.122  Questions typically were related to the process of conducting the
research and to the substance of the science issues.123  Plaintiffs’ questions were
generally more in the style of a cross-examination and defendants’ questions
generally were more expository.124
The deposition process could be described as one of flexible informality.
Some questions, especially those dealing with the process of preparing the re-
port, were posed to more than one panelist in an informal “joint deposition”
format.  If a panel member did not know the answer to a question, he or she
could refer it to another panel member.125
a. Plaintiffs’ requests for documents.  In December 1998, plaintiffs’ attor-
neys requested, among other items, copies of the experts’ notes and any other
evidence of communications among panel members concerning preparation of
the report—including communications with counsel—as well as drafts of the re-
port or any outlines.126  Defendants and special counsel objected.  After the par-
ties were unable to resolve the issues in dispute, Judge Pointer directed the par-
ties to brief two issues: “(1) whether communications among panelists may be
discovered; and (2) whether the parties are entitled to discovery of the panel-
ists’ drafts and working notes.”127
121. See Order No. 31I, Protocol for Discovery Depositions, Dec. 21, 1998, In re Silicone Gel Breast
Implants Prods. Liab. Litig. (MDL 926), 793 F. Supp. 1098 (J.P.M.L. 1992) (No. CV92-P-10000-S)
(visited Jan. 29, 2001) <http://earth.fjc.gov/BREIMLIT/ORDERS/order31i.rtf>.
122. See Handouts, Predeposition Conference with Judge Sam C. Pointer, Feb. 3, 1999, Silicone Gel
Breast Implants (No. CV92-P-10000-S) (on file with authors).
123. See id.
124. Some examples of plaintiffs’ attorneys questions give a flavor of the confrontational questions
the panelist faced.  Plaintiffs’ background questions included:  “Are you an expert in the following
areas: toxicology, pathology, polymer chemistry, neurology, or epidemiology?” and “Have you
conducted any original research on silicone or breast implants?”  See id.  Plaintiffs’ process questions
included: “In preparing for your testimony today, please tell us what you reviewed, who you met with,
what was said, who else was present, and what else, if anything, did you do?” and “Did the panel adopt
any procedures for reviewing the materials and preparing the report?”  Plaintiffs’ questions addressing
the science issues included:  “Do you find granuloma in healthy individuals or is that an indication of a
disease process?” and “What criteria did you use to determine if the elevation of risk in the studies
referenced on Page IV-7 are substantial or consistent and what epidemiological literature do you rely
on for your criteria?”  The nature of these questions can be explained by the comment of one plaintiffs’
attorney, who indicated that the PSC attorneys were representing plaintiffs’ attorneys across the
country and accordingly felt pressure to be especially thorough.
125. Sometimes special counsel would whisper to the expert after a question was asked, but no one
objected.
126. See Plaintiffs’ Memorandum on Discoverability at 3, Silicone Gel Breast Implants (No. CV92-P-
10000-S).
127. Id. at 1.
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Plaintiffs argued that their right to obtain notes, drafts, and other materials
was a central part of their right under Rule 706 to cross-examine a court-
appointed expert and that the materials sought were clearly within the scope of
discovery as set out in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26.128  Defendants
claimed that the request included material that was privileged because it was
used in the decisionmaking process, analogizing to cases involving arbitrators,
hearing examiners, and other decisionmakers.129  In reply, plaintiffs argued that
the panelists were witnesses, not adjudicators.130
Judge Pointer did not issue a ruling on the general request for documents.
Rather, he ruled on requests for specifically identified documents.131  On several
occasions, he examined an item in camera before ruling on its discoverability.132
Judge Pointer first ruled that the “Summary of Review of Articles,” which two
colleagues had prepared at one expert’s request, was discoverable.133  In that
ruling, he decided that the work of the panelists generally is a proper subject of
inquiry and production.  He rejected the general “decisionmaking privilege”
claim.134  To reassure the experts, he commented that examining notes or pre-
liminary reports need not be a source of embarrassment and suggested to the
attorneys that examining the details of such drafts may be a waste of time.135
b. Examination on contacts with party representatives.  Plaintiffs’ and defen-
dants’ attorneys questioned the experts regarding their contacts with colleagues
who served as party consultants.  On several occasions, the experts had profes-
sional contacts with the party experts, but these contacts were not related to
silicone gel breast implants.  For example, one expert co-authored an article
with an expert witness for a defendant, and another expert participated in a
symposium with a party expert.136  The experts also took precautions to keep the
contacts professional.  One expert knew that faculty colleagues had consulting
relationships with defendants, and avoided talking with these colleagues about
silicone gel breast implants.137
128. See id. at 5-13.
129. See generally Transcript of Rule 706 Panel Hearing Before the Honorable Sam C. Pointer, Jr.
at 15-16 (Feb. 4, 1999) (on file with authors) (ruling rejecting defendants’ claim of privilege).
130. Special counsel participated in a conference call with Judge Pointer and the defendants’
attorneys considering the plaintiffs’ request but did not file a brief or other written argument relating to
the request.  In response to the request, special counsel produced documents from two of the experts,
including a record of all telephone calls from one expert’s office during a two-year period, not limited
to calls in which breast implants were discussed.  Both experts turned over notes and critiques, and one
provided a copy of her original working outline.  See id. at 6.
131. See id. at 8, 15.
132. See id. at 245-47.
133. See id. at 15-16.
134. Id.
135. See id. at 16.
136. See id. at 51-53, 154.
137. See id. at 83, 152-53.
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The experts were not always able to take these precautions, however.  One
expert had problematic contact with a paid consultant for a defendant.138  Their
conversation dealt with the consultant’s opinions on various studies that were
central to the issues under review, the consultant’s opinion on the validity of le-
gal claims, and the consultant’s recommendation of a book seen as favoring de-
fendants’ viewpoints.139  Because the expert was not aware of the consulting re-
lationship, she thought the consultant’s interest was purely scientific and put the
consultant’s name on the panel for the Washington, D.C. meeting.140
c. Attorneys’ reactions.  With few exceptions, both plaintiffs’ and
defendants’ attorneys thought the process for discovery depositions was fair.
Neither side felt that they got all of the procedural benefits they sought, but on
balance both found that the process met their clients’ needs and interests.
Not surprisingly, defendants liked having the questions submitted in ad-
vance, while plaintiffs thought this process reduced their ability to ask questions
effectively.141  The main rationale for this procedure was to improve the quality
of the experts’ answers by allowing them to prepare adequately.
d. Experts’ reactions.  The experts’ reactions to the discovery depositions
ranged from puzzlement as to their necessity to indignation and even outrage at
their intrusiveness. One panelist thought there was no need for depositions of
any kind and that the report should be judged on its scientific merit.  This
expert asserted that “science was not served by this adversarial proceeding.”
Another panelist did not understand why discovery depositions, separate from
trial depositions, were necessary.  Not all experts had negative reactions to the
depositions, however.  One panelist was pleased with the discovery depositions
and appreciated having a copy of the questions in advance.  Two panelists
found the requests for documents to be intrusive and generally inappropriate
for a scientific inquiry.  One expert believed that raw materials and notes
should be kept so that others could replicate a study.   Such notes and records
are not public property, however, but the intellectual property of the scientist;
thus, the notes should not have to be disclosed for cross-examination.
The panelists’ reactions measure the gulf separating the scientific and legal
spheres.  One panelist, despite extensive briefing by special counsel before the
discovery deposition, was shocked at the degree of disclosure required.  Other
panelists showed varying degrees of disagreement with fundamental principles
of the legal system, such as access to discovery materials and rights to confront
and cross-examine opposing viewpoints.
2. Motion to Disqualify a Panel Member and Discharge the Panel.  Out of
the discovery depositions arose a highly controversial challenge to the status of
138. See id. at 186-89, 368-69, 382-97.
139. See id. at 382-97.
140. See id. at 132-34, 396-97.
141. See supra note 37.
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a panel member and the panel itself,142 which generated national publicity.  The
evolution and resolution of this conflict contains important lessons for
instructing experts on the limits of communication between appointed experts
and the parties and the need to set clear standards for identifying conflicts of
interests when scientific experts are recruited for court appointment.
During and shortly after the discovery depositions, plaintiffs’ attorneys
found that one of the expert panel members had solicited and received funds
from one of the defendants to support a professional conference that was unre-
lated to silicone or breast implants.143  In the selection and screening process,
that expert had disclosed a contribution of $5,000 from one defendant but failed
to disclose a contribution of $500 from another defendant.144  Plaintiffs’ investi-
gation of this payment led to further depositions of the expert and a biostatisti-
cian who worked as part of the expert’s team.145
In the additional discovery depositions, plaintiffs obtained more information
about contacts between the expert and the defendant.146  None of these contacts
related to silicone gel breast implants.147  Judge Pointer found that defendant’s
contacts were not intended to influence the expert’s work and that the work was
“impartial, unbiased, neutral, objective, and unaffected by any relationship or
contact with the defendants.”148
After the discovery depositions, and about a week before the videotaped
trial depositions began, plaintiffs filed a motion to vacate the expert’s appoint-
ment as well as the appointments of the other panel members and to withdraw
the panel’s report.149  Shortly after receiving the papers filed by the parties,
Judge Pointer denied the motion orally on April 19, 1999, the day before video-
taped depositions began.150
In a written ruling issued during the videotaped trial depositions—but be-
fore this expert was scheduled to testify—Judge Pointer explained his denial of
plaintiffs’ motion.  He detailed the screening process used to identify conflicts
of interest, clarifying three aspects:
(1) The screening form successfully elicited information about the ex-
pert’s fundraising for the conference, and he had properly disclosed
a $5,000 payment;151
142. For a description of the context of that challenge, see Order No. 31L, Denying Plaintiffs’
“Motion for Relief from Prejudicial Bias,” Apr. 25, 1999, In re Silicone Gel Breast Implants Prods.
Liab. Litig. (MDL 926), 793 F. Supp. 1098 (J.P.M.L. 1992) (No. CV92-P-10000-S) (visited Jan. 29, 2001)
<http://earth. fjc.gov/BREIMLIT/ORDERS/order31l.rtf>.
143. See id. at 1.
144. See id. at 4-5.
145. See id. at 1.
146. See id. at 11-12.
147. See id.
148. Id. at 1 n.1.
149. See id. at 1.
150. See id. at 2.
151. See id. at 4-5.
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(2) the screening form directed the experts to report any changes or
additions in his or her conflict-of-interest situation to a screening
panel that was no longer functioning;152 and
(3) the question of whether the biostatistician working with the expert
had any conflicts of interests was never examined.153
Plaintiffs argued that the expert should have reported the additional activity to
the court.154  Judge Pointer ruled that this was unnecessary, especially because
most of the communications occurred after the report had been issued pub-
licly.155  Nevertheless, this incident highlights some effects of the absence of an
explicit mechanism for addressing conflicts of interest that arise during the
course of a lengthy appointment.
In initially restricting communications with defendants about breast implant
matters, Judge Pointer intentionally did not limit communications with defen-
dants regarding matters other than breast implants.  Judge Pointer explained in
his April 1999 ruling that his earlier choice “was deliberate,” made “in recogni-
tion that the panelists’ work on the Panel would be only one of their many pro-
fessional activities, [and that] they should not be unnecessarily restricted by
preventing them from routine contacts with pharmaceutical companies in per-
forming activities unrelated to issues involved in breast implant litigation.”156
Accordingly, the expert’s belief that it was allowable to make such contacts
“was both understandable and reasonable” and not a basis for disqualification.157
Judge Pointer’s ruling framed an issue that is part of the larger debate about
whether court-appointed experts should be used in adversarial litigation.  Plain-
tiffs’ attorneys argued that the shift of research funding from public to private
sources has created subtle biases among researchers.158  Thus, the search for
neutral, unbiased scientists is fruitless.  Judge Pointer found that accepting this
view “would, in essence, have precluded consideration of a substantial propor-
tion of academicians, who were perhaps the persons most qualified to provide
valid and reliable opinions.”159
Prior to the expert’s scheduled testimony, special counsel made an oral mo-
tion in limine to control the order of questioning so that issues related to the re-
port would come first, and issues related to the conflict of interest allegations
152. See id. at 9-10.
153. See id. at 6-8.
154. See id. at 9-10.
155. See id. at 11.
156. Id. at 6.
157. Id.
158. See id. at 3.
159. Id. Understandably, given the national and international publicity about the allegations of
conflict of interest and bias, the court-appointed expert was quite upset.  Special counsel representing
the expert filed a motion in limine to prohibit plaintiffs from “exploring these meritless but
inflammatory allegations of bias in their examination of” the expert.  Special Counsel’s Motion in
Limine, Apr. 18, 1999, In re Silicone Gel Breast Implants Prods. Liab. Litig. (MDL 926), 793 F. Supp.
1098 (J.P.M.L. 1992) (No. CV92-P-10000-S).  Judge Pointer denied the motion.
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would come later.160  Judge Pointer denied the requests in an oral ruling.161  He
found not that the matters alleged showed bias or lack of objectivity but that
there was an arguable appearance of bias.162  Therefore, Rule 706 gave plaintiffs
the right to cross-examine the expert,163 which included the right to sequence the
examination.  As noted above, because Judge Pointer was presiding over multi-
district litigation, he had to worry that a restriction on cross-examination could
result in a trial court finding the panel member’s testimony to be inadmissible.
This incident yielded lessons that should guide future screening for conflicts
of interest.  At the least, a mechanism for disclosing and considering post-
appointment questions regarding potential conflicts of interest should be estab-
lished.  In addition, a mechanism is needed for screening and reviewing the
qualifications of any colleagues working with the expert, because allegations of
serious conflicts of interest concerning a significant contributor to an expert’s
report could contaminate the entire report.  Without a mechanism for prior
screening, no one would know whether a member of an expert’s team was even
a shareholder or grantee of a defendant.
Finally, this incident revealed the “cultural chasm” between scientific and
legal approaches to questions of bias and conflicts of interest.  Judge Pointer
observed:
It appears that the approach of scientists is to critique research largely confined to the
four corners of the reported research; “ad hominem” considerations directed at the
individuals involved in that research generally are to be disregarded and may be
viewed as inappropriate attacks upon the integrity of those individuals.  On the other
hand, the approach of those involved in litigation, at least in this country’s adversarial
system, tends to be one of skepticism and distrust, ready to consider possible motiva-
tions and influences that may have affected, even subconsciously, the conduct or con-
clusions of a study or, indeed, even the reported observations upon which the study is
based.
This attitudinal difference, if the court is correct in its assessment, can produce some
dysfunction when, as here, persons from the scientific community with little or no ex-
perience in litigation are co-opted into the legal system via court-appointment under
Rule 706.  This is a matter that deserves greater consideration and exploration as per-
sons from both perspectives consider further use of Rule 706.  Certainly this court, on
reflection, sees that more detailed instructions as to what should and should not be
permitted while a scientist serves as a court-appointed expert would have been desir-
able in bridging the gap.164
Judge Pointer’s observations have implications for screening, instructing,
and providing counsel for court-appointed experts.  Because the ground rules
are established by the legal system generally, and Rule 706 specifically, fairness
demands that experts be fully informed of the risks and demands of the system
160. See Transcript of Video Deposition at 118-26, Apr. 26-27, 1999, Silicone Gel Breast Implants
(No. CV92-P-10000-S).
161. See id. at 129-36.
162. See id. at 130-33.
163. See id.
164. Order No. 31L, Denying Plaintiffs’ “Motion for Relief from Prejudicial Bias,” Apr. 25, 1999, at
14, Silicone Gel Breast Implants (No. CV92-P-10000-S) (visited Jan. 29, 2001) <http://earth.fjc.gov/
BREIMLIT/ORDERS/order31l.rtf>.
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before agreeing to serve.  The panel members agree.  Having observed this ex-
pert’s experience, one expert panel member we interviewed would participate
again only if the rules were clarified at the outset and special counsel were ap-
pointed earlier to frame the conditions of the appointment.
3. Trial Depositions.  Trial depositions were held on eight consecutive days
from April 20 to April 27, 1999, in Judge Pointer’s courtroom in Birmingham,
Alabama.165  Special counsel for the panelists conducted the direct examination,
followed by cross-examination by a defendant’s attorney, followed by cross-
examination by a plaintiffs’ attorney.  Each panelist was permitted to be present
while the other panelists were being examined.
All counsel were required to submit a list of specific topics of inquiry prior
to the deposition, referring to specific parts of sections of books and articles.166
Topics involving “matters in which surprise is needed for effective impeach-
ment” did not have to be submitted in advance.167  Plaintiffs listed an average of
fifty topics for each of the four witnesses, covering the witness’s qualifications,
biases (including relationships with others who may be biased), methods of
studying the issues, particular studies examined, and scientific issues relating to
the final report.  Topics included (1) “biases of [the witness], including prior
relationships with industry”; (2) “appropriateness of a panel member accepting
money or other benefits from a party and/or failing to disclose a benefit re-
ceived”; and (3) “biases or weaknesses of the studies relied upon by [the wit-
ness] for her opinions.”168
Most of the testimony during the eight days of depositions focused on the
technical details of the scientific standards and the studies on which the experts
did and did not rely.169  On the whole, the testimony was complex and presented
in scientific and technical terminology.  Special counsel led each of the experts
through his or her direct testimony.  Each witness prepared slides, overheads, or
blowups to outline major points.  These presentations resembled lectures and
were aimed at an intelligent, but not necessarily scientifically sophisticated,
audience.  The experts explained basic terms, the criteria for analysis, and sup-
porting studies.170  Special counsel generally posed broad questions, launching
the expert into a narrative lecture.  Plaintiffs objected to the form of the testi-
165. See Order No. 31K, Protocol for Trial Perpetuation Depositions, Mar. 10, 1999, at 1, Silicone
Gel Breast Implants (No. CV92-P-10000-S) (visited Jan. 29, 2001) <http://earth.fjc.gov/BREIMLIT/
ORDERS/order31k.rtf.>
166. See id. at 2.
167. Id.
168. Plaintiffs’ List of Topic Areas and List of Documents for Trial Examination of Dr. Betty
Diamond,  Silicone Gel Breast Implants (No. CV92-P-10000-S) (on file with authors).
169. See, e.g., Transcripts of Video Depositions, Apr. 20-26, 1999, Silicone Gel Breast Implants (No.
CV92-P-10000-S) (on file with authors).
170. See Transcript of Video Deposition of Dr. Nancy K. Kerkvliet, Apr. 24, 1999, Silicone Gel
Breast Implants (No. CV92-P-10000-S) (on file with authors).
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mony; Judge Pointer overruled the objections subject to final rulings from trial
court judges who may use the videotapes.171
a. Attorneys’ reactions.  Attorneys for plaintiffs and defendants found
the procedures for the trial depositions to be fair.  A couple of attorneys
questioned the division of labor between special counsel and defendants’
attorneys.  There was considerable overlap because, in essence, both elicited
direct testimony, explaining and supporting the experts’ report.  That overlap of
roles, however, is due to the expert panel’s uniform conclusions and its direct
alignment with defendants’ interests in the litigation.172  In other cases, it may be
that an expert’s report will not fully support one side or the other, and there will
be a need for special counsel to give the experts an opportunity to present their
report before the parties challenge it.  Having special counsel conduct the direct
examination seems necessary, given the barrier to ex parte communication that
must be imposed on attorneys for the parties.
b. Experts’ reactions.  Two experts felt that the trial depositions focused
less on the science issues than the discovery deposition had.  Panel members
appreciated the written questions for the discovery depositions and would have
liked them for the trial depositions.  The experts also had complaints about the
videotaping process. Some were dissatisfied with the technical aspects of the
videotaping, particularly the inability to display computerized graphics on the
overhead projection machine.  Another expert captured the general sense of
the uncertainty about the usefulness of the videotapes: “I don’t know about the
videotapes, about how and whether they will be used.  I see them sitting on a
shelf.  Who will use them? Who will edit them down to a useable size?”173
VII
COST OF THE PANELS OF EXPERTS
The costs associated with the use of technical advisors and court-appointed
experts typically are charged to the parties.174  Because of the expected benefits
of the panels’ work in breast implant product liability cases throughout the na-
tion, both Judge Jones and Judge Pointer sought partial payment of panel ex-
penses from appropriations to the federal judiciary.175  The Judicial Conference
171. See id. at 148-49.
172. See supra text accompanying notes 96-98.
173. See supra note 37.
174. For authority on the payment of court-appointed experts, see FED. R. EVID.  706(b).  See also
CECIL & WILLGING, supra note 31, at 59–62 (noting that the flexibility of the rule permits the court to
rely on the parties to compensate the expert).
175. See JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS,
REPORTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 46 (1996)
[hereinafter JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS].
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granted Judge Pointer’s request but declined Judge Jones’s.176  This section will
discuss the costs of the two programs.
A. Hall v. Baxter Healthcare Corp.
Judge Jones wrote to officials in the judicial branch seeking federal funding
of approximately $60,000 for his panel’s work, noting that the experts’ reports
would be useful in resolving the numerous silicone gel breast implant product
liability cases pending in federal and state courts.177  In denying Judge Jones’s
requests for payment, the Committee on Court Administration and Case Man-
agement doubted that such benefits could be achieved in the context of local
litigation and preferred that the expert panel perform its work as part of the
multi-district litigation proceedings.178  The Committee feared that funding
Judge Jones’s panel would encourage the development of local panels in other
cases that could duplicate or contradict the work of the national panel.179  Fol-
lowing the Committee’s decision, Judge Jones asked the parties to pay the out-
standing amounts owed to the advisors, which they reluctantly agreed to do.180
The parties paid approximately $76,000 in fees and expenses for the four panel
advisors and the special master.181
B. In re Silicone Gel Breast Implant Products Liability Litigation
In his request for federal funding, Judge Pointer noted that the panel’s work
would become part of the record in the 22,000 breast implant cases that had
been consolidated in the multidistrict litigation process.182  A single report from
a national panel of experts would provide a consistent foundation for decisions
regarding the admissibility of evidence and contested factual issues.183  A single
report could also save time and money spent on multiple independent expert
panels in individual trials.184  Judge Pointer noted that funding by the federal ju-
dicial branch would show the court’s “commitment to resolving difficult legal-
scientific questions in a manner that emphasizes ‘truth’ rather than partisanship
or the parties’ resources.”185
The Judicial Conference approved the expenditure of $400,000 to support
the work of the panel, and barred the use of payments by the parties to supple-
ment this amount.186  Two years later, with the work of the expert panel well un-
176. See Hall v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 947 F. Supp. 1387, 1393 n.9 (D. Or. 1996) (“Although I
requested funding for the Rule 104 experts, my request was denied.”).
177. See JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, REPORTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS, supra note 175.
178. See id. at 46.
179. See supra note 37.
180. See id.
181. See Hall, 947 F. Supp. at 1393 n.9.
182. See JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, REPORTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS, supra note 175, at 46.
183. See supra note 37.
184. See JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, REPORTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS, supra note 175.
185. See supra note 37.
186. See JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS,
SUMMARY OF THE REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE COMMITTEE ON COURT
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derway, Judge Pointer requested, and was granted, an additional $400,000 to
support the panel’s continued work.187 In his supplemental request, Judge
Pointer noted unexpected difficulties encountered by the selection panel in
identifying candidates suitable for appointment.188 The six selection panel mem-
bers required extensive deliberations to agree on the best available scientists to
fill the positions.189  Approximately half of the time was spent screening for con-
flicts of interest.190  Together, these factors increased the expense of the search
beyond the expected amount.191  Moreover, the amount of material submitted by
the parties for review by the science panel members greatly exceeded expecta-
tions.192  Some panel members conducted their own searches of scientific litera-
ture for additional material rather than rely completely on the parties’ submis-
sions.  The Judicial Conference approved Judge Pointer’s request for additional
funds with the requirement that “the expenses be funded by the parties to the
extent it was legal, feasible and consistent with prior representations to the par-
ties.”193  Even before receiving this qualification from the committee, Judge
Pointer had imposed the cost of the special counsel and a number of consulting
experts on the parties.194
The total cost of the national panel of experts, including fees and expenses,
was $939,983.74.195  Of that amount, the federal judiciary provided $733,645 for
selecting the experts and preparing the experts’ report.196  The remaining
$206,338.74 reflects fees and expenses of the experts that arose during their
depositions and testimony and was shared equally by the parties.197  The parties
paid the cost of two special counsels to represent the panel members, which ex-
ceeded the total spent on the experts themselves.  According to information
provided by the administrator of the two court-administered funds established
to support the work of the special counsels, fees and expenses relating to work
ADMINISTRATION AND CASE MANAGEMENT 29 (1998) (on file with authors) [hereinafter JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE, SUMMARY OF THE REPORT].
187. See id.
188. See supra note 37.
189. See id.
190. See id.
191. The selection panel members were paid a total of $62,498 for the time and expense required to
identify and nominate the experts.  The selection panel members were compensated at $200 per hour.
Although this was the same rate paid to the national science panel members, it was less than some of
the selection panel members charged previously when appointed by the court as special masters or
experts.  Several panel members did not charge for all of the hours spent working on panel business,
and one panel member declined to request payment, preferring to contribute her time to the project.
See supra note 37.
192. The parties submitted over thirty-five linear feet of materials for review by the panel members.
See supra note 37 .
193. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, SUMMARY OF THE REPORT, supra note 186, at 29.  The Judicial
Conference also directed that specific expenditure controls be adopted for the remainder of the
contract and that Judge Pointer seek reimbursement for the judiciary’s expenses from any resulting
mass class-action settlement.  See id.
194. See supra note 37.
195. See id.
196. See id.
197. See id.
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by the two special counsels was at least $1,157,594.67.198  The second special
counsel, Ina Leonard, was appointed to represent the experts at depositions late
in the process; her fees and expenses represent seven percent of the total
amount.199
In our interviews, some attorneys from each side complained about the cost
of the special counsel prior to the trial depositions.  They raised specific ques-
tions about the need for special counsel to review the hundreds of scientific
publications submitted to the panel by the parties.  Both the attorneys and the
experts complained that Mr.  Kobayashi was often unavailable to respond to is-
sues in a timely manner.  Even defense attorneys “felt like [they] were at odds
with Mr. Kobayashi.”200  One believed that “the parties should not be placed in
an adversarial role with special counsel.  [The attorneys] were frustrated with
the lack of information [they] received from him.”201  In the future, the role of
special counsel should be clarified at the outset, particularly with regard to the
extent that counsel should become involved in the substance of the panel’s
work.
As one expert panel member commented, this initial effort at using an ex-
pert panel in the multidistrict litigation revealed ways to reduce costs.  Sugges-
tions included the use of rosters, setting clearer plans and goals for the panel’s
work, and clarifying the role of special counsel.
VIII
PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT OF WORK OF PANELS OF NEUTRAL EXPERTS
The two programs examined in this report represent innovative extensions
of the use of expert panels to respond to complex expert evidence.  In Hall v.
Baxter Healthcare Corp., the panel offered assistance to the court in ruling on
the admissibility of scientific evidence.202  In In re Silicone Gel Breast Implants
Products Liability Litigation, the panel offered a report and videotaped testi-
mony intended to become part of the record in all cases returned to the district
198. Letter from Mr. Edgar C. Gentle III, Attorney-accountant appointed by Judge Pointer to
administer the funds, to Mr. Thomas E. Willging 3, tbl. II (Dec. 20, 2000) (on file with authors).  Mr.
Gentle noted that this amount “[did] not include any of the disbursements made by the National
Defendants directly to [special counsel] Mr. John Kobayashi.”  Id. at 1.  Also, these costs did not reflect
the fees and expenses of Mr.  Kobayashi and his colleagues in preparing the videotapes and transcripts,
a task that remains ongoing.  See id. tbl. III.  Mr. Kobayashi, the other attorneys, and the legal assistants
were compensated at their customary hourly rate, up to a maximum of $200 per hour.  This cap is less
than Mr.  Kobayashi’s usual hourly rate.  See Order No. 31F, Appointment of Special Counsel to
National Science Panel, Jan. 13, 1997, ¶ 4, In re Silicone Gel Breast Implants Prods. Liab. Litig. (MDL
926), 793 F. Supp. 1098 (J.P.M.L. 1992) (No. CV92-P-10000-S) (visited Jan. 29, 2001) <http://earth.
fjc.gov/BREIMLIT/ORDERS/order31f.rtf> .
199. See Letter from Mr. Edgar C. Gentle III, supra note 198, at 1-3, tbl. II (on file with authors).
As of February 2001, editing of the National Science Panel video depositions continued.  As of
December 2000, the cost related to the editing totaled $164, 945.25.  See id. tbl. III.
200. See supra note 37.
201. See id.  Mr. Kobayashi declined our request for an interview.  See FJC STUDY, supra note 15.
202. See Hall v.  Baxter Healthcare Corp., 947 F.  Supp. 1387, 1392 (D. Or.  1996).
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courts.203  In each instance, the expert panels developed technical reports of ex-
traordinarily high quality and presented findings consistent with those of recent
independent science panels.204
It remains difficult, however, to specify the effects of the two expert panels.
In Hall, Judge Jones stayed his summary judgment order, relying heavily on the
work of the expert panel until he could consider the report prepared by Judge
Pointer’s panel.  The cases before Judge Jones then settled and, consequently,
Judge Jones’s order was never reviewed on appeal.  Judge Pointer regarded the
report by his panel to be an intermediate product and the experts’ videotaped
testimony as final.205  Extensive settlement activity continued simultaneously
with the panel’s work, making it difficult to specify the impact of the panel and
leaving few cases in which the videotaped testimony can be considered.  This
Part offers a preliminary assessment of the effect of the panel reports based on
the impressions of the participants and citation of the reports in related litiga-
tion.
A. Hall v. Baxter Healthcare Corp.
We asked the participants whether the science issues were adequately ad-
dressed by the appointed experts and whether the proceedings achieved the
courts’ objectives.  Judge Jones expressed general satisfaction with the process.
Specifically, he indicated that the advisors aided his assessment of the conflict-
ing scientific analyses offered by the parties.  As a result of the hearing and
Judge Jones’s subsequent ruling dismissing plaintiffs’ expert evidence on sys-
temic injury claims, all cases subject to the hearing have settled.206
The technical advisors thought the process was beneficial in that it brought
science to the courtroom and defined the boundaries of the causation debate.
They expressed, though, that both more specific guidance and more time was
needed to review the technical literature and prepare the report.  Overall the
advisors found their participation to be informative and beneficial.
Attorney comments varied.  In general, defense attorneys, whose claims
were furthered by the advisors’ reports, were more pleased with the process.
One defense attorney thought the process worked because the court and the
parties focused on the question of scientific causation.  Plaintiffs’ attorneys,
whose claims were weakened by the reports, were disappointed by the process.
Several plaintiffs’ attorneys, for example, thought Judge Jones’s decision was in
conflict with at least one advisor’s findings that favored plaintiffs.  One attorney
suggested that a judge should not rely on inherent authority in appointing ex-
203. See Order No. 31, Appointment of Rule 706 Expert Witnesses at 1-2, In re Silicone Gel Breast
Implants Prods. Liab. Litig. (MDL 926), 793 F. Supp. 1098 (J.P.M.L. 1992) (No. CV92-P-10000-S)
(visited Jan. 29, 2001) <http://earth.fjc.gov/BREIMLIT/ORDERS/order31.rtf>.
204. See Review of the Reports of the Independent Review Group and the National Science Panel, in
SAFETY OF SILICONE BREAST IMPLANTS, supra note 12, at 505-14 app. c.
205. As of February 2001, the editing of the videotaped testimony had not been completed.
206. Virtually all state court breast implant cases have settled, due in part to the joint hearing at
which Judge Jones presided with a state court judge.
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perts.  Similarly, another attorney suggested that the court’s power to appoint
technical advisors is defined explicitly in the Federal Rules of Evidence, to-
gether with procedural safeguards.  Rule 706 contains clear and explicit, though
perhaps incomplete, rules governing court-appointed experts, yet no similar
procedural path is defined under Rule 104.
Since Judge Jones stayed his summary judgment order pending the release
of Judge Pointer’s National Science Panel’s report, citations to Judge Jones’s
holding are rare.  The opinion, however, has been cited for innovative use of
panels of technical advisors,207 development of authority for in limine proceed-
ings,208 and its definition of “differential diagnosis.”209
B. In re Silicone Gel Breast Implant Products Liability Litigation
When we interviewed Judge Pointer in October 1999, he could not assess
the process, because the videotaped depositions had not yet been introduced at
trial.  Judge Pointer did note, however, that the report appears to have had con-
siderable impact on the dynamics of settlement negotiations.  Although cases
have settled at the same rate throughout the panel’s tenure, the value of claims
for systemic injuries has diminished.210  As a result of the national panel’s report,
systemic injury claims are no longer part of the process.  Their absence has
pushed down the dollar amounts of settlements.211  Of course, the total effect of
the report and testimony by the panel will not be known until that testimony is
presented at trial.
Overall, the expert panel members thought the court’s objectives were
met.212  The experts reviewed the relevant scientific material, indicated areas of
consensus within the material, and set the boundaries of the scientific debate.
The experts, however, were not without complaints.  One panel member was
frustrated over not knowing how and whether the panel’s report would be used
as evidence at trial.  Another thought it difficult to make immediate decisions
based on complex, conflicting, and sometimes incomplete data.
207. See Association of Mexican-American Educators v. State of Cal., 231 F.3d 572, 610 (9th Cir.
2000) (Tashima, J., dissenting).
208. See Allison v.  McGhan Med. Corp., 184 F.3d 1300, 1310 (11th Cir.  1999).
209. See Glastetter v.  Novartis Pharm. Corp., 107 F. Supp. 2d 1015, 1019 (E.D. Mo. 2000).
210. Michael Green, a professor at the Wake Forest University School of Law, stated that “as a
consequence of the report it will be hard to find a federal judge who will permit a case to be tried or
who will sustain on post-trial motions a plaintiff’s claims to systemic disease.”  Gina Kolata, Panel Can’t
Link Breast Implants to Any Diseases, N.Y.  TIMES, Dec. 2, 1998, at A1.
211. “The mere anticipation of that court-appointed panel’s report influenced the course of breast
implant litigation.  Plaintiffs reached a $3.2 billion settlement with implant maker Dow Corning
Corporation, driven in part by the pressure of the anticipated report.” Erichson, supra note 1, at 1983.
Defense attorneys familiar with the litigation opined that the mere pendency of the national panel’s
report helped to resolve breast implant cases with systemic claims before Judges Weinstein and Baer in
New York.  See Thorpe et al., supra note 1, at 34.
212. See Hulka et al., supra note 10, at 812-15 (“We believe that such panels should be used more
frequently, because they can bring unbiased information about complex scientific and medical issues
into the courtroom.”).
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Most panel members felt the entire process could have been completed in a
year if they had had firmer deadlines.  Delays in starting the review process, get-
ting materials to the experts, appointing special counsel, and finding an efficient
means of communicating among themselves extended the time required to pre-
pare the reports.  In general, it appears that the overall experience was satisfy-
ing, because all of the experts would consider serving as a court-appointed ex-
pert in the future, though perhaps under somewhat different conditions.
The views of attorneys in the MDL process appear to be affected by the ex-
tent to which their claims were furthered by the panel’s report.  Most plaintiffs’
attorneys thought that the overall procedure failed to resolve properly the sci-
entific issues and that expert panels should be reserved for narrower questions.
One attorney thought the court’s instructions were too vague and permitted
ambiguous responses, suggesting that the instructions be drafted around the
Daubert standards.  Another attorney thought the panel members should have
been treated as other trial witnesses and should have received no special protec-
tion from the court.  Most plaintiffs’ attorneys saw very little use in the panel’s
report and videotaped testimony.  Due to the length of the process, most cases
have settled.  Moreover, the testimony will soon be outdated as new studies ap-
pear.213  Plaintiffs’ attorneys felt that the “final product resulted from ‘special’
procedures that favored the defense.  The process had no benefits for [our] cli-
ents, it was very expensive and time-consuming, but it was our only choice.”214
In contrast, defendants’ counsel thought use of the expert panel was a step
toward ensuring that unreliable evidence would not be admitted.  One attorney
commented that the expert panel presented a more accurate picture than party-
retained experts would have, especially in mass tort cases with high economic
stakes.  Another felt that the parties’ experts were more candid when they
spoke before peers on the panel at the hearing, resulting in admissions by par-
ties’ experts unusual to the discovery process.
Several defense attorneys were confident that the report and testimony will
be useful in resolving questions about causation of systemic disease.  They be-
lieve it has heightened attention to the scientific issues and will give judges
more confidence to rule on science-based claims.  One defense attorney cau-
tioned against underestimating this “power of the [national p]anel’s report to
give nonscientist judges the courage and confidence to rule.”215  They expect the
panel’s report will help build a consensus on these issues and minimize the in-
consistent rulings among different courts.  Another defense attorney com-
mented that the major value of the report is its corroboration of defendants’
experts’ positions.  Yet another thought the report had an impact on the Dow
213. See, e.g., Louise A.  Brinton et al., Breast Cancer Following Augmentation Mammoplasty, 11
CANCER CAUSES & CONTROL 819 (2000).
214. See supra note 37.
    215.   See id.
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Corning bankruptcy proceeding by setting the context in which those negotia-
tions took place.216
The above assessment of the National Science Panel’s impact may be af-
fected by the release of the videotaped testimony, but the panel’s report has so
far been cited consistently with other reports in excluding expert testimony
linking silicone gel breast implant with systemic disease or injury.217 Concerns
that the panel’s report would not be used consistently appear to have been un-
warranted.218
IX
SUGGESTIONS FOR USE OF PANELS OF NEUTRAL EXPERTS
Using court-appointed experts is appropriate when the evidence is espe-
cially demanding and the opportunity for reasoned and principled consideration
based on submissions by the parties has been exhausted or offers little prom-
ise.219  The difficulty of accommodating the conflicting values of science and law
within such a process is unlikely to satisfy those who insist on the deliberate and
open-ended consideration that is characteristic of science, or those who insist on
the speedy and certain resolution of issues that is valued by law.220  Even in the
best circumstances, such appointments should be invoked only after careful
thought.
216. In In re Dow Corning Corp., the Panel’s report was cited to demonstrate that “new” research
negates the case that silicone gel causes some diseases alleged by breast-implant claimants.  244 B.R.
634, 655 (Bankr. E.D.  Mich. 1999).
217. See Allison v.  McGhan Med. Corp., 184 F.3d 1300, 1311 (11th Cir. 1999) (citing the Panel’s
report to illustrate the thoroughness of efforts to ascertain the reliability of the scientific evidence);
Grant v.  Bristol-Myers Squibb, 97 F. Supp. 2d 986, 989-90 (D. Ariz.  2000) (citing the Panel’s
conclusion that “‘[n]o association was evident between breast implants and any of the individual
connective tissue diseases’”); Pozefsky v.  Baxter Healthcare Corp., 194 F.R.D. 438, 440 (N.D.N.Y.
2000) (“In the absence of expert testimony concerning the causal link between the leakage of silicone
from breast implants and autoimmune or corrective tissue disease, Plaintiff cannot establish a prima
facie case.”); Bushore v.  Dow Corning-Wright Corp., 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20697, at *9-15 (M.D. Fla.
Nov. 15, 1999) (addressing the four Daubert factors and citing the Panel’s report for its discussion of
causation and its conclusion that the evidence does not currently support a scientific finding of
causation).
218. Two law professors claim the report is not having the effect intended by Judge Pointer and
others.  They claim that early citation to the panel’s results show “signs of conflict and redundancy”
that will ultimately “jeopardize the utility of the Panel findings and, even more importantly, may
discourage the future appointment of similar panels.”  Walker & Monahan, supra note 10, at 817.  As
an illustration, they cite an unpublished case where a federal judge refused to allow the Panel’s findings
to be heard by a jury, which subsequently returned a verdict in direct conflict with the Panel’s findings.
See id. at 813.  This jury award was subsequently overturned by the trial judge, claiming that there was
no scientifically valid basis for the jury verdict in the record.  See D.C. Judge: $10 Million Breast
Implant Judgment Lacks Evidence, Reversed, MEALEY’S LITIG. REP.: EMERGING DRUGS & DEVICES,
Oct. 5, 2000, at 15.
219. See CECIL & WILLGING, supra note 31, at 88–89.
220. As one expert panel member stated,
In science, it is not a failure to say “I don’t know.” One can think about the issue a bit
longer and have time to think about how to respond.  One can give a thoughtful answer,
not the first one that comes to mind.  The law’s need for an immediate decision is
inconsistent with science’s interest in waiting for a correct answer.
  See supra note 37.
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Despite the high quality of the information developed by the expert panels,
interviews with the participants revealed a number of difficulties that are likely
to arise in the future.  In this part, we describe suggestions for judges to con-
sider when appointing and using such panels.  Most of these were either explicit
suggestions of the participants or implicit in their comments.
First, the court should explore opportunities to develop the information
necessary for thoughtful consideration of complex evidence without taking the
extraordinary step of appointing experts.  Expert panels are costly, time-
consuming, present difficult issues of administration, and raise concerns about
the independence of judicial consideration.  In the two cases presented here, the
complexity of the evidence and the importance of establishing an accurate
foundation for future litigation argued strongly for such extraordinary proce-
dures.  It should be noted that not all litigation will warrant four or five expert
witnesses sitting as a panel.  Many multidistrict litigations or individual cases or
classes or consolidations require only one witness in a key discipline.
Second, the court should carefully consider the role that appointed experts
will play in the litigation.  The anticipated role of the expert will determine the
legal authority that the court invokes to undertake the appointment.  The court
should generally articulate the questions it wants the experts to address at the
beginning of the process.  Doing so will help define whether technical advisors
or court-appointed experts are needed, who they should be, what they should
be asked to do, and how they should present their conclusions.
Appointing a panel of experts as technical advisors under the inherent
authority of the court may be appropriate in the rare event that the judge re-
quires direct advice from the expert panel.221  The judge must then decide what
procedural protections are necessary to ensure that the parties’ interests are not
inadvertently compromised.
More frequently, expert panels will be appointed under Rule 706 and will be
subject to its procedures.  Potential experts must be clearly informed of the de-
mands of the legal system when they consider the possibility of accepting the
appointment.  Experts appointed as witnesses must be informed that their tes-
timony, not the preliminary written report, is the final product of their ap-
pointment.  They must be told that, in addition to providing testimony, they
may be deposed about the basis of their opinions and possible conflicts of inter-
est.
Third, the court, with the parties’ assistance, should determine which areas
are needed to consider the evidentiary issues.  Matching the skill of panel mem-
bers with the needs of the litigation may be a difficult task, especially where the
necessary skills represent narrow specialties or overlapping areas.  In both
cases, it proved difficult to find appropriate candidates willing to serve on the
expert panels.  The court may choose to seek assistance from professional or-
221. See Reilly v. United States, 863 F.2d 149, 154-55 n.4, 156 (1st Cir.  1988) (concluding that a
district court has discretion to appoint a technical advisor, but it is expected that such appointments will
be “hen’s teeth rare,” a “last” or “near-to-last” resort).
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ganizations to assist them in finding qualified and neutral experts.222  The judge
must determine whether to seek experts who are experienced or inexperienced
in the topic of the litigation.  Potential experts who are aware of existing re-
search in the disputed area or who have participated in studies will have a
strong background in the issues but may also have preconceived notions inap-
propriate to the litigation.  Experts unfamiliar with the disputed issues, on the
other hand, will require additional time to become familiar with the issues.
Fourth, a court must screen the candidates for possible conflicts of interest.
In both of these cases, direct and indirect ties to the corporate defendants made
it difficult to find particular types of experts, such as toxicologists.  Different
conceptualizations in science and law of what constitutes a “conflict of interest”
can result in misunderstandings.  To avoid these problems, judges should con-
sider using the screening questionnaire developed by the selection panel of spe-
cial masters serving Judge Pointer.  This questionnaire required written certifi-
cation by the expert that no conflict existed as defined by the court.  Parties
should have an opportunity to review the credentials and background of those
considered for appointment and to object to those they believe to be unquali-
fied.  Such participation should give the parties more confidence in both the ex-
pertise and neutrality of the candidate and should enhance the legitimacy of the
appointment.  The court should also establish a procedure for monitoring po-
tential conflicts of interest arising during the litigation.  For example, colleagues
of panel members contacted for assistance on litigation issues must also be
screened for conflicts of interest.
Fifth, the court should establish a procedure for organizing the panel’s work.
One possibility is to designate, or have the panel members select, one panel
member as a convenor and administrative chair.  This will permit easier coordi-
nation of tasks when the panel must work together as a group.  This person can
be the contact for communicating with the panel when it is necessary to ex-
change materials with the court or parties.
Sixth, shortly after appointing experts, the court should specify the duties
and functions of the experts in a written order.  This order should include the
issues that the experts are asked to consider, the limitations and procedures for
contact with persons outside the panel, including the judge, and the procedures
that the panel should employ in presenting its information to the court.  The ex-
tent of discovery and scope of depositions also should be established at the out-
set.  To avoid problems with static instructions, a mechanism should be estab-
lished permitting the court to expand and clarify the instructions as needed,
with participation by the parties.  Any substantive change in the instructions or
procedures should be recorded as part of a written order and made available to
the experts.
Seventh, the court should establish a budget with input from the experts and
parties once the duties of the experts have been determined.  Such a procedure
222. See Court Appointed Scientific Experts: A Demonstration Project of the AAAS, supra note 6;
Registry of Independent Scientific and Technical Advisors, supra note 6.
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will help ensure that a realistic budget is maintained.  In devising the budget,
adequate administrative resources must be provided to support the panel’s
work.
Eighth, the court should maintain administrative oversight over the panel to
ensure that it proceeds in a prompt and efficient manner.  Such oversight may
include establishing deadlines, or at least goals, for the panel’s work, including
the development of interim products.  The court also may need to supervise an
information exchange process in which the parties (1) summarize their argu-
ments and proposed findings of fact for the appointed experts; (2) prioritize or
rank all written materials submitted to the panel; and (3) respond to queries
from panel members regarding the parties’ proffer of expert evidence.
Ninth, a judge should consider appointing special counsel to represent inex-
perienced witnesses who will be deposed or cross-examined.  The court should
specify the role of special counsel in considerable detail, making clear which, if
any, administrative duties will be undertaken by special counsel.  A clear defini-
tion of this role will permit special counsel to speak with authority in areas des-
ignated by the court and avoid those activities in which there is no consensus
regarding the involvement of special counsel.
X
CONCLUSION
These two programs represent innovative attempts to develop mechanisms
to strengthen the ability of federal courts to consider challenging scientific evi-
dence.  Each program adapted existing rules and precedents to allow scientific
experts appointed by the court to respond to a perceived need for additional
analysis beyond that offered by the parties’ experts.  Each program strength-
ened the ability of the court to consider such information and to provide an in-
formed assessment of the evidence.  Each program also faced obstacles that fu-
ture users might anticipate, and all participants found areas in which alternative
approaches might have yielded better results.  Numerous variations are possi-
ble, each framed to address the specific needs as they arise.  The willingness of
courts to explore such alternatives will become important as courts confront in-
creasingly complex evidence.
HOOPER_FMT.DOC 06/04/01  1:40 PM
Page 139: Autumn 2001]  CAUSATION IN BREAST IMPLANT LITIGATION 185
APPENDIX: CONFLICT AND BIAS SCREENING QUESTIONNAIRE
In re:
SILICONE GEL BREAST IMPLANT
PRODUCTS LIABILITY LITIGATION
(MDL-926)
Silicone Breast Implant Science Panel
Potential Sources of Bias and Conflict of Interest Questionnaire
Instructions to Individuals Completing this Form
Before you start to complete the questionnaire please review the list of corpo-
rate defendants on page five and read the “General Statement Concerning Bias
and Conflict of Interest” on page two and “Instructions for Completing the
Questionnaire” on page three.
Do not skip any questions.  If you require clarification of any of the items on
the questionnaire, contact Professor Alan Wolf of the Selection Panel for assis-
tance.*
When you have completed the questionnaire, sign and date the form and return
it to Professor Wolf by fax or express mail.
Promptly report to the Selection Panel any changes or additions to the informa-
tion reported on this form while you are either being considered for service on the
Science Panel or while serving on the Panel.
Contact Information
Name: (Mr./Mrs./Ms./Prof./Dr.) ____________________________
Telephone: _____________________________________________
Fax: _____________________________________________
Email: _____________________________________________
Title: _____________________________________________
Employer: _____________________________________________
Address: _____________________________________________
* Contact information for Professor Alan Wolf deleted.
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General Statement Concerning Bias and Conflict of Interest
The Silicone Breast Implant Science Panel (hereafter, the “Science Panel”) will
be charged with the responsibility of evaluating and critiquing pertinent scien-
tific literature and studies bearing on issues of disease causation in the breast
implant litigation.  Since members of the Science Panel will be working directly
for the court as neutral, independent experts, it is essential that panel members
be free from any conflict of interest or significant bias as well as the appearance
of such conflict or bias.  This information is needed to ensure the integrity of
the Science Panel.  By screening potential members before they are selected,
this questionnaire also safeguards panelists’ professional and personal reputa-
tions by minimizing the possibility that embarrassing conflict or bias issues will
arise in the courtroom.
“Bias” generally refers to views stated or positions taken that are largely intel-
lectually motivated or that arise from the close identification or association of
an individual with a particular point of view or the positions or perspectives of a
particular group.  For purposes of service on the Science Panel, the following
are examples of potentially problematic forms of bias:
1. A panel member being placed in the position of reviewing his or her own work
(or that of a family member, close friend, or colleague) for validity or scientific
merit.
2. A panel member being committed to a fixed position on a particular issue
through public statements (e.g., testimony, speeches, interviews, lectures, etc.),
publication (e.g., articles, books, etc.), close identification or association with the
positions or perspectives of a particular group, or through other personal or pro-
fessional activities.
Certain forms of bias may be more properly characterized as conflicts of inter-
est—e.g., where the individual is a senior officer of a professional society that
espouses a fixed position on the issue.
“Conflict of Interest” means any financial or other interest which conflicts with
the service of an individual because it could either impair the individual’s objec-
tivity or create an unfair competitive advantage for any person or organization.
A conflict is likely to be present where the efforts of the Science Panel may re-
sult in a direct or indirect economic benefit or loss to particular individuals or
groups.  Illustrative examples of direct economic benefit include:
1. A panel member (or member of his or her immediate household) has a significant
financial investment or other close tie to a corporate defendant.  (Highly diversi-
fied mutual funds investing in one or more corporate defendants do not constitute
a significant investment.)
2. A panel member has a family member or close friend who is a party to the action,
or who is otherwise involved in the litigation (e.g., a family member who is an at-
torney involved in the litigation).
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Examples of indirect economic benefit include:
1. A panel member is a junior faculty member whose department chair (or other
senior faculty) has taken a fixed position regarding the merits of this litigation.
2. For purposes of critically reviewing the relevant scientific literature, a panel
member requests that another scientist furnish him or her with the raw data un-
derlying a published work.  Rather than using the data solely for the purposes of
serving the court, the panel member envisions using the data for his or her own
subsequent research efforts.  (In such a case the panel member should contact all
relevant parties for permission to use the data.)
The examples above are illustrative, but not all-inclusive.  If you have any ques-
tion as to the existence or appearance of bias or conflicts, please bring these
matters to the attention of the Selection Panel.
Instructions for Completing the Questionnaire
Please note that the following questions refer variously to “you,” “you or any
members of your household,” or, most broadly to “you, members of your
household or members of your department.”
Any reference to an “interested party” refers to:
1. plaintiffs and defendants in the current litigation
2. individuals or organizations that are otherwise substantially involved in the cur-
rent litigation (e.g., law firms)
3. individuals or organizations that otherwise have a stake in the outcome of the liti-
gation (e.g., “educational” organizations funded primarily by a party or medical
societies)
4. potential litigants (e.g., close friends or relatives who have implants, and are
therefore potential plaintiffs).
Your responses to the following questions should be typed on additional sheets
of paper, rather than on this form.
Please provide all relevant details for any questions answered in the affirmative.
An affirmative response to one or more questions does not automatically dis-
qualify you from serving on the panel.  Further explanations may, however, be
requested.
If the answer to a question is contained in your curriculum vitae you may simply
refer to and attach the appropriate pages from it.
Personal interests
1. Are you or any members of your household interested parties?
2. Do you have close friends or family members who are plaintiffs in these actions,
attorneys involved in this litigation, or are employed by defendant corporations?
HOOPER_FMT.DOC 06/04/01  1:40 PM
188 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 64: No. 4
Financial interests
3. Have you or members of your household ever worked for any interested party to
the silicone breast implant litigation? (This includes both work relating to the im-
plant litigation and any other type of work.)
4. Have you or members of your household ever received any research funds,
graduate support, or any other funds (awards, honoraria, speaking or consulting
fees, etc.) from any interested party?
5. Do you or members of your household currently have significant investments in
any of the defendant corporations in the form of stocks, bonds, etc.? (You need
not report highly diversified mutual funds or similar investment vehicles.) Do you
or members of your household currently have investments in corporations which,
although not parties to the litigation, have a stake in its outcome?
6. Have you, members of your household, or members of your department con-
ducted any research in the area of disease causation due to silicone breast im-
plants? Was this research funded? If so, by whom? Did this research result in
publication? If so, give citations.
7. Have you or members of your household conducted any research which was
funded by corporations which, although not parties to the silicone implant litiga-
tion, have a stake in its outcome (e.g., pharmaceutical corporations that use sili-
cone in medical devices)? Have you or members of your household served as con-
sultants to such companies on any matter?
Public statement and positions
8. Have you, members of your household, or members of your department made
any public pronouncements (e.g., to the press, to a class, or at a professional
meeting) regarding: any aspect of the silicone breast implant litigation; the con-
duct of the parties to the litigation; your conclusions as to the relationship be-
tween breast implants and any of the medical conditions (e.g., systemic lupus, ery-
thematosus, rheumatoid arthritis, scleroderma, polymyalgia) that plaintiffs
complain of?
9. Do you have any colleagues** at your institution or others, or a close friend at any
institution, who has conducted research in the area of diseases allegedly caused
by silicone breast implants? Have you ever shared a grant with these individuals?
Have you ever co-authored any research publication with these individuals?
10. Have you or members of your household ever been contacted by anyone (e.g.,
parties, the press, lawyers) as regards silicone breast implants or the related litiga-
tion? What was the extent of this contact?
11. Have you ever reviewed a grant proposal or a journal article relating to diseases
that might be caused by silicone breast implants?
Previous Litigation Experience
12. Have you ever served as an expert witness? If so, who were the parties to the ac-
tion? For whom did you work? What was the nature of your involvement in that
litigation? (e.g., did you prepare reports? testify? were you deposed?)
Additional information
13. Please report any service (full-time or part-time) with federal, state, or local gov-
ernment that may be related to the silicone breast implant litigation.  Also in-
clude any other consulting or advisory work with professional organizations,
** For purposes of this question, a colleague is a person with whom you have a significant
interaction in research, teaching or administration.
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trade associations, public interest groups, or civic groups that may be related to
the litigation.
14. Is there any other connection between you and any interested party—or any
other factor—that might impair your ability to serve on the Science Panel that has
not been addressed by any of the above questions? Are there factors that others
might reasonably construe as creating such impairments?
I have read the “General Statement Concerning Bias and Conflict of Interest”
and the “Instructions for Completing the Questionnaire” and have answered
the above questions in light of those statements, completely and to the best of
my ability.  I know of no reason why I cannot serve the Court as a neutral, un-
biased, and independent expert.
_______________________________ ______________________
SIGNATURE DATE
